

# *Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization*




# Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization Quarterly Progress Report

## Q4 - Year 2015



<b>Project Title:</b>	Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS)
<b>UNDP Project ID:</b>	00089459 (output ID: 00095684)
<b>Project Duration:</b>	May 2015 – May 2017
<b>Project Resources:</b>	Received: \$33.5 million. Germany, USA, Korea, UK, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Norway, Sweden, France and Austria
<b>UNDP Iraq Focal Point</b>	Prime Minister's Office
<b>UNDAF Outcome(s)</b>	Outcome 1: Government and Communities' resilience to disasters (man-made and natural) strengthened
<b>CP Outcome(s)</b>	Outcome 3: Improved livelihoods opportunities for ISIL-affected communities
<b>Output(s)</b>	Output 1: Rapid local stabilization and recovery assessments Output 2: Stabilization and recovery initiatives in newly accessible areas
<b>Implementing Partner</b>	UNDP
<b>Responsible Partner</b>	UNDP
<b>Project Location(s)</b>	Newly liberated areas of Salah al-Din, Anbar, Ninewah, and Diyala governorates

### Contributing Partners



# Table of Contents

3

Executive Summary .....	3
Project Background .....	4
Overview of the Fourth Quarter .....	6
Implementation Progress.....	9
Salah al-Din .....	10
Output 1 .....	11
Activity 1.1 .....	11
Output 2 .....	12
Activity 2.1 .....	12
Tikrit .....	12
Al Dour and Mkeishifah.....	12
Monitoring and Evaluation.....	13
Activity 2.2 .....	13
Tikrit .....	13
Al Dour and Mkeishifah.....	15
Monitoring and Evaluation.....	16
Activity 2.3 .....	16
Activity 2.4 .....	16
Anbar .....	18
Output 1 .....	18
Output 2 .....	19
Activity 2.1 .....	19
Activity 2.2 .....	19
Activity 2.3 .....	19
Activity 2.4 .....	20
Ninewah .....	21
Output 1 .....	21
Output 2 .....	22
Activity 2.1 .....	22
Activity 2.2 .....	22
Activity 2.3 .....	23
Activity 2.4 .....	24
Diyala .....	26
Project Photos .....	28
Challenges and Issues.....	37
Lessons Learned .....	40
Future Plans .....	42
Financial Section.....	43
Table 1. Funding Overview: Contributions and Expenditures .....	43
Table 2: Expenditure Status (by donor) .....	44
Annexes .....	45
Annex I: List of FFIS Projects .....	45
Salah al-Din Governorate.....	45
Anbar Governorate .....	48
Ninewah Governorate.....	49
Diyala Governorate .....	50
Annex II: Performance Tracking Matrix.....	51
Annex III: Risk Framework.....	57

**Cover Photo: The Qadisiya police station after refurbishment by UNDP.**

# Executive Summary

---

During the fourth quarter of 2015, UNDP expanded the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS) operations to work in a total of four governorates significantly impacted by the occupation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The first Steering Committee meeting, held in November, endorsed expansion in Salah al-Din and new interventions in Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar. Security operations in Ramadi, Baiji, and Sinjar have opened new cities for stabilization interventions, while the political environment in Diyala was more amenable for FFIS.

Donor countries had contributed \$13 million by early December which supported stabilization efforts in Salah al-Din (Tikrit) and Ninewah (Sinuni). In the last three weeks of December, UNDP had received a total of \$34.5 million from thirteen contributing nations with another \$13 million in hard pledges. As of early January, \$21 million has been committed to projects in the four governorates. Detailed financial figures are provided in the financial overview section of this paper. UNDP originally requested \$59 million for the entire project; however, experiences in 2015 lead UNDP to increase the overall budget to \$100 million, of which approximately \$70 million is budgeted for 2016.

Tikrit, the capital of Salah al-Din governorate, comprised the bulk of UNDP stabilization efforts during the fourth quarter. Twenty-nine light infrastructure rehabili-

tation projects are near completion and five were completed, which are estimated to have directly supported over 130,000 beneficiaries who returned to their homes since August 2015. Specifically, in Tikrit, water rehabilitation projects increased the water availability and quality above the pre-conflict levels. Electricity rehabilitation projects are enabling the governorate to reach 100 percent of the demand. Over 1,150 girls and boys are benefiting from refurbishments to four schools, and 30,000 people in Tikrit will benefit from refurbished health facilities. Cash for work and small business grants supported 500 families, cleaned neighborhoods and public spaces throughout the city and revived nine faculties and three administrative buildings in Tikrit University that now boasts 18,000 registered students for the current semester. The Tikrit FFIS activities cost \$8.3 million, a modest investment with high impact, and bolstered by Salah al-Din Governorate's on-budget investments in Salah al-Din stabilization. UNDP expanded activities in Salah al-Din to Al Dour and Mkeishifah, key towns between Tikrit and Baghdad, during the reporting period.

After endorsement by the Steering Committee in November, FFIS activities expanded beyond Salah al-Din. Ongoing security operations in Ramadi precluded UNDP from engaging in activities in the contested city, but prepared the ground for implementation once Ramadi is cleared. Notably, UNDP supported Ramadi stabili-

zation efforts by embedding a Stabilization Advisor with the Anbar Governor's Office; commenced procurement of 103 generators, three mobile substations, and six ambulances for prepositioning; and built a network of potential partners for livelihoods and community reconciliation interventions. In Ninewah governorate, UNDP began and completed rehabilitation of the Sinuni hospital, which services Yazidi residents. The FFIS team conducted a scoping mission to Al Saadiyah, opening the door for the first phase of intervention in Diyala.

The expansion of areas of engagement has required UNDP to bolster its staff and its operational capacity. UNDP fully staffed the Operations Service Center during the reporting period, which allows UNDP to more quickly and effectively implement

FFIS activities than in previous quarters. The Operations Center, headed by an international operations manager, is staffed by finance, procurement, and human resources experts for FFIS. Standing up the Operations Center has allowed UNDP to quickly procure equipment for Ramadi as well as hire additional staff to support FFIS activities.

Some overall political and security challenges remain, which have impacted stabilization efforts in liberated areas. One of the lessons learned, six months after the start of FFIS, is the need for a more robust monitoring system with external verification mechanisms, not just to measure the immediate project achievements, but also the wider impact of stabilization in newly liberated areas.

## Project Background

---

Iraq has been undergoing political, economic, and social turmoil as a result of the conflict with the ISIL. The occupation of approximately one-third of Iraq's territory by the summer of 2014 resulted in the displacement of 3.2 million Iraqis. The Government of Iraq and its security forces have undertaken clearing operations in the governorates of Salah al-Din, Ninewah, Anbar, and Diyala, and have liberated key areas that require stabilization support. In late 2014, the Prime Minister of Iraq His Excellency Haider Al-Abadi and Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Iraq agreed to establish a joint UN trust fund to support stabilization and reconstruction in areas liberated from ISIL control. In March of 2015, the Government reviewed the structure of the trust fund and decided to separate stabilization, for which UNDP prepared a concept note for a stabi-

lization funding facility. The Prime Minister and leading members of the Stabilization Working Group of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, co-chaired by Germany and the United Arab Emirates, endorsed the note. Following the Working Group's endorsement in April 2015, UNDP developed the project document to create FFIS, which was formally established on 11 June 2015.

The objective of the project is to support the Government of Iraq's ability to respond to people's needs in areas that have been cleared by ISIL. Further, the project directly benefits hundreds of thousands of Iraqis in liberated areas who have endured traumatic conflict. UNDP is the primary implementing agency of FFIS, though it may partner with UN agencies for specific projects, and contracts with NGOs and other vendors facilitate many activities.

The FFIS Project Document outlines four primary areas of engagement:

1. Window 1: Public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation. This window will be used to finance light repairs of key public infrastructure clinics, police stations, water facilities, power grids, government buildings, and access roads.

2. Window 2: Livelihoods. This window will be used to finance activities aimed at jump-starting the local economy and generating income for local households, particularly families returning to their homes, including women. The cash for work activities, as mentioned above, are part of this cash injection into the local economy. In addition, it intends to provide microcredit grants to small businesses with high community impact. Where possible, support will be given to women and vulnerable households.

3. Window 3: Capacity support. This window will be used to finance technical support for local governments, boosting their immediate response capacity to cope with the challenges arising during stabilization. The intention is to recruit and deploy technical experts to support planning, implementation, and monitoring functions, and possibly support to women's committees in the provincial councils. The expectation is that these deployments will be short-term, until government funding comes online to absorb these staff or transition them.

4. Window Four: Community reconciliation. This window will be used to finance programs that help local leaders and community groups promote social cohesion and dialogue. The intention is to provide microcredit grants to community organizations to support local reconciliation activities, to train community facilitators for

reconciliation, with special attention to local women's groups, and to start a restorative justice process.



The areas of engagement are informed by a needs assessment process, as detailed in Outcome 1 Activity 1.1 of the UNDP Performance Tracking Matrix. According to the plan, UNDP provides the methodology for rapid and detailed stabilization needs assessments following a prioritization process led by the Government. The three primary objectives of the needs assessment process are:

1. Collect pre-conflict and post-conflict data on the conditions of the health, education, electricity, water, and municipality sectors;
2. Prioritize six and 24-month priorities, which will inform governorate stabilization plans, and resource allocations to address priority needs identified;
3. Develop the capacity of provincial governments to conduct needs assessments and use them for stabilization and reconstruction planning.

Based on the needs assessments, Window 1 projects are selected through a consultative process with the Government, UNDP, and affected populations. In most areas, needs far outweigh resources available to UNDP. Therefore, UNDP and the Government (including the Governor, the Control

Cell, and the Office of the Prime Minister) deliberate and agree on which priorities will be supported through FFIS.

Implementation of priorities identified by the needs assessment process are endorsed by the FFIS Steering Committee. The Steering Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff and the DSRSG serving as secretariat. Top donors to FFIS are sitting members and relevant governors are also invited. The Steering Committee is a key oversight body for FFIS activities, and ensures FFIS activities support the Government's stabilization strategy.

The FFIS engagement criteria for Windows 3 and 4 differ from Windows 1 and 2, which are based on needs identified through consultations with primarily the Government of Iraq. Capacity-building needs are determined directly with Governorate officials, notably the Governor, as well as with UNDP Local Area Development Programme (LADP). For Window 4, best practices in community reconciliation suggest that civil society are the most effective implementing partners, due in part to political sensitivities involved in reconciliation and dialogue work. Civil society partners help UNDP prioritize areas needing community reconciliation interventions. The reconciliation committee of the Provincial Council

has also been an important counterpart for the NGO work.

FFIS is one tool by which the Government of Iraq carries out its stabilization efforts, and the four windows outlined in the Project Document are avenues to support the Government's stabilization efforts. As is detailed in the FFIS Project Document, "different windows of this project will be implemented by government entities, NGOs and [community-based organizations], and possibly other UN agencies. However, ownership by and the leading role of the Iraqi Government (particularly at the governorate level) are critical and should include decision-making power on project-funding and priority setting through consultative processes with the international partners and stakeholders." As such, the driver of UNDP's stabilization activities is the Government of Iraq. Other essential components of stabilization, such as security and rule of law provision, are outside the purview of the current Project Document and are the responsibility of the Government to set in place. This presents operational risks to UNDP's stabilization activities, as well as opportunities for the Government to demonstrate leadership in tailoring and owning its response in the post-liberation period.

## Overview of the Fourth Quarter

---

The Quarter 4 reporting period examines the implementation progress between 1 October 2015 and 31 December 2015. During this period, UNDP rapidly expanded the pace and geographical scope of its interventions. In the previous two quarters, UNDP focused on initiating the project, hiring staff, and implementing activities predominantly in Tikrit. During Quarter 4, the first FFIS Steering Committee met and

formally endorsed several areas of engagement prioritized by the Prime Minister's Office and the governors.

The expansion of FFIS activities during the reporting period is in part due to successful clearing operations by Iraqi Security Forces and its partners in the key cities of Baiji, Sinjar, and Ramadi, priority cities for the Prime Minister of Iraq's stabilization efforts. The

Steering Committee also endorsed FFIS engagement in the towns of Al Dour and Mkeishifah in Salah al-Din; Rabiya and Sinuni in Ninewah; and Al Saadiyah in Diyala. UNDP conducted needs assessments in Al Dour and Mkeishifah during the reporting period, as well as a preliminary needs assessment in Ramadi. These build on the

Tikrit, Ninewah, and Amerli assessments conducted in Quarter 3, the findings of which are detailed in Table 1.0. UNDP mission to Al Sa'adiyah resulted in a preliminary assessment, while missions to Tikrit, Rabiya, and Sinuni allowed UNDP to reassess the stabilization environments.

**Table 1.0: Summary table of stabilization needs assessments and FFIS assistance until 31 December 2015**

Area	6-month priorities	FFIS funded (estimate)	24-month priorities
<b>Zummar, Rabiya, Sinuni and Wanna (Ninewah Governorate) – Sinjar assessment in process</b>	USD 19,232,601	USD 1,870,000 (FFIS only focusing on Sinuni/Sinjar and Rabiya)	USD 50,063,359
<b>Tikrit District (Salah al-Din Governorate)</b>	USD 16,245,000	USD 8,670,000	USD 61,030,000
<b>Al Dour/Mkeishifah (Salah al-Din Governorate)</b>	USD 9,054,000	USD 3,160,000	USD 11,970,000
<b>Al Sa'adiyah (Diyala governorate)</b>	assessment ongoing		
<b>Ramadi (Anbar governorate)</b>	assessment ongoing. USD7,300,000 FFIS funding pre-positioned		
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>USD 21,000,000</b>	

The Operations Service Center has expedited operational timelines especially for Window 1 activities; however, execution of FFIS activities relies on amenable security conditions. Baiji was declared liberated in October, but the security conditions are still tenuous and thus far precluded UNDP and government officials from reaching the long-contested city. Similarly, Sinjar was declared liberated in November and Ramadi in December, but access to and engagement in these areas are still challenged by significant threats in the immediate aftermath of liberation. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are widespread, as is the risk of other asymmetric attacks as seen in Baiji and Ramadi. Political tensions are also especially sensitive in some liberated areas such as Sinjar, control of which is contest-

ed between several armed groups. Ethnic tensions are also dangerously prevalent between Kurdish, Yazidi, Shi'a, and Sunni communities. The likelihood of the return of IDPs also varies significantly from city to city, as Ramadi residents are assessed to return soon after clearance while the return of Sinjar city residents is uncertain. UNDP distinguishes between liberation and clearance, the former being expulsion of ISIL from an area, and the latter defined as Iraqi Security Forces control, completion of the removal or account of IEDs, and ability for civilians, government officials, and nongovernmental organizations to return. Liberation is declared by the Prime Minister while clearance is declared by the National Operations Center. While liberation is an important political and military milestone,

FFIS requires Government control and the removal of hazards to implement activities.

In addition to these security concerns, UNDP considers the following as important criteria in prioritizing engagement: strategic importance of the area to the Government of Iraq; size of the displaced population and likelihood or rate of returns; and the scale of destruction resulting from ISIL occupation. All areas have been endorsed as areas of strategic importance to the Government, and UNDP missions and consultations with government and nongovernmental sources confirm the level of destruction. For returns, the International Organization for Migration

(IOM) Data Tracking Matrix reports that as of 3 December, a total of 458,358 individuals had returned to their location of origin in Iraq<sup>2</sup>. Of these, 55 percent (258,144) returned to Salah al-Din, 20 percent (92,562) returned to Diyala, and 15 percent (68,958) to Ninewah. IOM also tracked 18,312 displaced persons in Ninewah due to Sinjar security operations, and 26,514 returns to Ramadi in Anbar. Most of the returnees in Salah al-Din were to Tikrit and Al Dour, Al Khalis and Muqdadia in Diyala, and Telafar and Sinjar district (which includes Sinuni) in Ninewah.

<sup>2</sup> <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>


**Table 1: Overview of returnees since April 2015**

Governorate	District	Return figures 2015			
		09-Apr	04-Jun	10-Sep	17-Dec
Erbil	Mahmour	0	0	0	5,838
Anbar	Falluja	3,132	3,123	10,794	10,794
	Heet	0	2,250	2,250	2,250
	Ramadi	2,454	25,512	26,514	26,514
Diyala	Al Khalis	31,320	31,542	37,824	48,090
	Al Muqdadia	9,204	19,254	31,026	38,178
	Khanaqin	0	1,320	2,022	5,094
	Kifri	0	1,200	1,200	1,200
Kirkuk	Kirkuk	1,080	4,650	3,630	3,720
Ninewah	Mosul	0	438	438	438
	Telafar(Zummar, Rabia)	24,924	42,774	50,880	51,060
	Telkaif(Wana)	0	9,620	11,820	11,820
	Sinjar (incl. Sinuni)	0	0	0	5,640
Salahaldin	Al Dour	0	750	28,140	48,714
	Balad (Duloeya)	0	0	11,190	11,190
	Beji	0	2,742	8,250	9,420
	Samarra (Mkeishifa)	0	0	15,654	15,654
Tuz	0	0	0	5,736	
Tikrit		27,000	33,000	133,188	167,430
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>99,114</b>	<b>178,175</b>	<b>374,820</b>	<b>468,780</b>

# Implementation Progress

This section provides the qualitative overview of FFIS by governorate between 1 October and 31 December 2015. Each region is further broken down by outputs and activities. Progress against the Performance

Tracking Matrix as established in the FFIS Project Document signed by the Government of Iraq and UNDP in June 2015 can be found in Annex III.



**Map 1:**  
Fund Facility of Immediate Stabilization Areas of Engagement



## Salah al-Din

Implementation of stabilization activities across all four windows in Tikrit comprised the bulk of UNDP efforts during the fourth quarter. During this time, families continued to return to Salah al-Din. According to IOM figures from the Displacement Tracking Matrix ([www.iomiraq.net](http://www.iomiraq.net)), 258,144 individuals reported as having returned, of whom 167,430 returned to Tikrit district and another 48,714 to Al Dour district, the two main focus areas for FFIS. The return figures reflect the return of a wide variety of tribal communities, including those who were initially reluctant or prevented from returning.

FFIS activities aligned with the Salah al-Din Governorate's overall stabilization plans. The Governor and his staff implemented on-budget stabilization activities, which included repairs to basic service facilities in health, water, electricity, and municipal service sectors, as well as repairs to the Al Alam bridge. The Governor and the Provincial Council requested UNDP's continued support to the livelihoods activities, citing the success of the project as well as their inability to carry out similar public works schemes through on-budget mechanisms. The FFIS team is working with sister projects to facilitate livelihoods as Tikrit recovers from the conflict.

South of Tikrit, Al Dour and Mkeishifah have been added to the FFIS focus areas at the request of the Governor of Salah al-Din and endorsed by the Steering Committee. Along with Window 1 projects to rehabilitate water, health, electricity, and

education facilities, youth brigades have been mobilized to refurbish public spaces and clean the city. These rehabilitation activities started at the end of the year and are scheduled to be completed in the first quarter of 2016.

Political upheaval at the Governorate level caused some delay in decision-making on FFIS activities and follow-up to stabilization interventions in the governorate. The Chairman of the Provincial Council and several other key members of the staff were removed, and attempts to replace the Governor negatively impacted UNDP's engagement. However, by the close of the reporting period the political situation stabilized, and the Governor remained in his position.

*The Mayor of Tikrit, Omar al-Tikriti, says he's proud of the progress his city has made in the past seven months. "With the help of UNDP, the people of Tikrit have reestablished the essential services for our community. With water stations and electrical grids repaired and police stations, healthcare centers and schools rebuilt, people can now restart their lives." The Mayor was a major part of the operation to retake Tikrit, and he reentered the city just after ISIL was pushed out. "Water, electricity and healthcare were the first services that had to be restored. Following that we needed to provide livelihoods for people", al-Tikriti stated. He credits UNDP's cash-for-work program as instrumental. "Through those programs, we were able to clean up our community, provide income for the youth and keep them occupied with productive activities", the Mayor commented.*

The security situation in Tikrit continued to be relatively stable. Although ISIL fighters briefly attempted to retake control of areas south of Tikrit, the efforts were repelled by the Iraqi Security Forces. Operations in Baiji drew many of the Popular Mobilization Forces north of Tikrit, creating space for increased command and control of police in the city. Security operations in Baiji continued during the reporting period, resulting in the declaration of its liberation in October. However, the security threat to Baiji is still significant, and the road between Baiji and Tikrit remains volatile. Access to the city of Baiji has been restricted to security forces, who are carrying out the clearing of the city (removing of IEDs and explosive remnants of war) and securing the various neighborhoods. Once the city has been officially declared clear by the National Operations Center, UNDP will be able to organize an assessment mission.

### **Output 1: Rapid stabilization and recovery assessments are carried out with local authorities, UN agencies, and civil society actors.**

***Activity 1.1 UNDP provides the methodology for rapid and detailed stabilization needs assessments. Following a prioritization process led by the Government, detailed needs assessment reports were developed for liberated areas selected for intervention.***

The Governor of Salah al-Din requested that UNDP facilitate a workshop and produce the needs assessment report for Baiji and Al Dour/Mkeishifah, key areas south of Tikrit. The security situation in Baiji prevented UNDP and Government officials from carrying out a needs assessment. The Al Dour/Mkeishifah workshop was held in October, leading to the finalized assessment report, published in November.

UNDP worked to ensure that the Al Dour/Mkeishifah workshop was inclusive. In total, 24 participants attended the workshop, including two women, two representatives of civil society (from Al Dour) and several members of the Provincial Council. The participants engaged in a healthy debate regarding priorities, including diverse perspectives. The female participants were particularly vocal.

The findings of the workshop were verified by two UNDP site visits in early November. A FFIS engineer assessed public infrastructure damage and the embedded FFIS Coordinator in Tikrit consulted with residents of Al Dour and Mkeishifah, took photographs of proposed work sites, and assessed the economic situation. The site visits confirmed reports of extensive damage and helped inform livelihoods work. While a majority of the assessment was accurate, UNDP encouraged slight adjustments to the report to reflect short-term stabilization needs rather than longer term priorities. One example is the request for a hospital in Mkeishifah as a 24-month priority, which can be better categorized as a development request since there was no hospital in the sub-district prior to the conflict<sup>2</sup>. Details of the conflict damage are provided in the Al Dour/Mkeishifah report and summarized in the Window 1 section below.

---

<sup>2</sup> Although the Prime Minister's Office declared Baiji liberated in November 2015, the security situation remains volatile and government officials are not yet able to travel to the district. Despite initial hopes that the situation in Baiji would have been cleared by the end of the reporting period, ISIL's persistence around the town with the strategically important oil refinery has significantly inhibited government access. As a result, UNDP has been unable to start the needs assessment for Baiji.

## **Output 2: Iraqi Government is supported to address the immediate stabilization and recovery needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the sustainable return of IDPs**

### **Activity 2.1 Public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation (Window 1)**

Window 1 activities in Tikrit have comprised the bulk of UNDP efforts and budget during Quarter 4. UNDP has worked to implement a total of 29 projects in Tikrit and Al Dour/Mkeishifah during the reporting period, and five were completed. UNDP is on track to reach the target of 50 projects for Window 1 set for Salah al-Din in its 2016 Performance Tracking Matrix.

#### **Tikrit**

UNDP completed the following Window 1 activities during the reporting period: Ibn Sina hospital; the pharmacy; a police station in Qadisiya neighborhood; delivery of electricity equipment; and three schools in Tikrit. The water rehabilitation projects are near completion, and only require delivery of imported pumps. UNDP was requested to expand Window 1 activities to Tikrit University, which proved to be a significant stabilization factor for the city. UNDP was initially concerned that the refurbishments required at the University were too extensive for FFIS; however, ongoing consultations even after the needs assessment process indicated small investments in the University would have a significant impact on the stability of Tikrit. Refurbishing female dorms presented an opportunity to support 2,000 female students who otherwise could not study.

FFIS activities are having a substantive impact on beneficiaries in Tikrit. The water rehabilitation projects at the Tikrit central wa-

ter station, as well as Qadisiya I and II water stations, service approximately 80,000 people. These refurbishments improved water availability and quality that now exceed the original baseline. Prior to the destruction of the infrastructure, the water system only delivered 500m<sup>3</sup> per hour. With rehabilitation, the three water stations can deliver 3,250m<sup>3</sup> per hour (2,250m<sup>3</sup> for Tikrit central water station, 400m<sup>3</sup> per hour for Qadisiya I and 600m<sup>3</sup> per hour for Qadisiya II). For the first time the water is purified, filtered, and sterilized. The Directorate of Water noted that repairs to the electricity network in the water stations and installation of generators for the Directorate of Water result in the availability of clean water 24 hours a day. Critically, UNDP work on water did not interrupt water supply during the rehabilitation process. The Water Directorate noted that most of its staff have returned, and rehabilitated infrastructure can be maintained by this personnel.

The Pharmacy Department supplied medicine for the entire city and hospital. Electricity equipment, including 100km aluminum cable and 50 transformers were installed, and provide 50 percent of the electricity demands of Tikrit. The delivery of the mobile substation in Quarter 1 will meet 100 percent of Tikrit's electricity demands. Annex I outlines the projects, timetables, and quantitative impact of each activity.

#### **Al Dour and Mkeishifah**

The Al Dour and Mkeishifah assessment established the following baseline, verified by separate site visits by UNDP area coordinator, engineer, and liaison in Tikrit:

- Water sector infrastructure in both towns sustained significant damage, reducing supplies by over 70 percent and forcing people to use unfiltered salinized water directly from the wells. Two

of the main water stations in Mkeishifah were destroyed, and one in Al Dour.

- Three out of five power stations in Al Dour and the only two power stations in Mkeishifah were significantly damaged. This reduced power supply, already irregular prior to the conflict, to almost complete reliance upon personal generators. The local Electricity Departments acquired breakers to the power stations as stopgaps, but further repairs were required. Lack of electricity also significantly impacted livelihoods, which is largely agricultural-based and relies on pumped water.
- Three of Al Dour's health centers were burned or looted, forcing residents to travel to Samarra or Tikrit for basic services. The only primary healthcare center in Mkeishifah was also looted and destroyed.
- Fifteen of the 90 schools in Al Dour and four of the 10 schools in Mkeishifah were severely damaged and require rehabilitation.

At the request of the Salah al-Din Control Cell, and following consultations with Al Dour/Mkeishifah officials and residents, UNDP initiated procurement procedures for Window 1 activities and signed agreements with two NGOs to implement cash for work projects. In Al Dour, UNDP will renovate two primary healthcare clinics, two schools, and the main water station for a total estimated cost of \$1.4M USD. In Mkeishifah, UNDP will renovate two schools, the water station, and the primary healthcare center for an estimated cost of \$1 million. Cash for work activities in both areas will employ 200 people for 45 days during Quarter 1 for the cost \$236,880.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

Implementation of Window 1 activities has been monitored on three levels. First, UNDP hired engineers to monitor quality of work and project specifications. Engineers conducted site visits to Tikrit on a weekly basis, working closely with the contractors and line directors implementing the work. Second, each project was overseen by a Government committee comprised of officials from the pertinent technical departments and the contracting company. The committee was responsible for ensuring quality of work and that implementation was in line with agreed contract and capacity of the technical department. Third, UNDP area coordinator and international staff visited the projects twice during the reporting period. The site visits offered opportunities to monitor progress, as well as speak directly with local authorities such as the mayor, municipal officials, and the Governor's staff. UNDP also maintained regular communication with the Governor from Baghdad to receive questions and comments from his office. Finally, UNDP is in the process of hiring a third party monitor to oversee monitoring of projects and measure their impact. The third party monitor will also be able to gather reporting on public perceptions of projects being implemented, verify UNDP will meet or surpass UNDP implementation standards for Window 1 projects, and provide specific impact data. Monitoring and evaluation reporting data will be included in the 2016 Quarter 1 progress report.

### **Activity 2.2 Livelihoods support (Window 2)**

#### **Tikrit**

Public and Government response to the Tikrit livelihoods projects were more posi-

tive than UNDP anticipated. While other FFIS activities are critical, livelihoods projects are often the most visible, tangible, and immediate improvement felt by residents. Government officials, participants, partnering NGOs, and beneficiaries consistently reported to UNDP that the livelihoods program was essential to providing needed cash to returnees of Tikrit. Moreover, the livelihoods program generated momentum at a key time in the Tikrit stabilization phase when IDPs were returning

to their homes, and the process of clearing neighborhoods, mosques, schools, streets, and other public spaces demonstrated visible steps toward normalization.

Livelihoods projects in Tikrit began in late August and closed out by 15 December. UNDP partnered with two NGOs with experience in Tikrit, the Human Relief Foundation (HRF) and Al Noor Universal Foundation, to carry out cash for work and cash grant distribution.

Partner	Days	# Employed per Day	Work Opportunities	% Women/Youth
HRF	48	200	9,600	16% women/70% youth
Al Noor	50	200	10,000	11% women/85% youth

Al Noor began cash for work operations on 24 August, employing 200 persons per day during the reporting period to clean, paint, and lightly rehabilitate public buildings, streets, mosques, schools, parks, Tikrit University, and other community buildings. From October through December, Al Noor created 6,000 work opportunities bringing the total to 10,000 work opportunities generated since the start of the project. Beginning 1 September, HRF has created 9,600 work opportunities in Tikrit, approximately, 6,000 of which were during the Quarter 4 reporting period. HRF cash grants provided business grants to 100 shops by the end of the reporting period, which benefited bakeries, grocers, and repair shops in downtown Tikrit.

Cultural mores that prohibit women from conducting work outside the home in a mixed gender setting prevented FFIS implementing partners from reaching the gender target in this stage of the project. UNDP was able to support female returnees through rubble removal on 63 private properties owned by women. Women were also indirectly supported by cash for work activities

at Tikrit University, which reopened faculties and administrative buildings where women studied. During the next reporting period, UNDP will work with implementing partners to develop more specific criteria targeting women directly by identifying culturally appropriate work, as well as indirectly by targeting households with vulnerable women (single female heads of household, etc.). That said, our partner Al Noor far exceeded the 75 percent youth target, where by 98 percent of the participants were under the age of 32 and 85 percent under the age of 25.

The livelihoods project had the most significant impact on Tikrit University. The University sustained an estimated \$30 million in damages as a direct result of the fighting. While the Governor had prioritized the University as part of his stabilization plan, the original proposal far exceeded UNDP's resource capacity, thus UNDP had not factored Tikrit University into its initial livelihoods plans. However, UNDP modified the original proposal and mobilized cash for work teams to clean nine faculties, laboratories, six administrative and service buildings,

the surrounding environs and the gardens, creating 50-75 job opportunities per day for 36 days. The University, which opened its doors to registration on 1 November, anticipated 8,000 students of the 22,000 students to register. By the end of the reporting period, 16,000 students had registered and most classes were running. The University is an important element of life and the economy of Tikrit, the cleaning and support to it was yet another factor that changed the conflict narrative. It is expected that with the completion of the female dormitories, an additional 2,000 students will register.

### Al Dour and Mkeishifah

As UNDP closed out its livelihoods activities in Tikrit, the Al Dour and Mkeishifah needs assessment process identified the criticality of livelihoods support. Al Dour and Mkeishifah were liberated immediately prior to Tikrit in April 2015, but are still struggling to recover from the significant damage to livelihoods. Similar to the Tikrit experience, returnees to Al Dour and Mkeishifah required economic opportunities in the form of short-term work and cash grants for small businesses, as well as labor to clean the rubble and rehabilitate public spaces. At the end of the reporting period, UNDP signed contracts with Al Noor and HRF to conduct cash for work and cash grants activities in the two areas, which will take place over a three-month period.

UNDP has been requested repeatedly to continue livelihoods programs beyond the initial four months not only by beneficiaries of the Tikrit livelihoods projects, but also by the Government of Salah al-Din. The cash injection in the local economy is to jumpstart economic life and bring about the positive dynamics of communities restoring their lives and livelihoods. UNDP's sister project Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Program (ICRRP), which designs longer term livelihoods support programs is currently

identifying more sustainable employment creation initiatives in newly liberated areas which may facilitate the transition from stabilization to recovery.

As detailed in previous reports, UNDP invested substantial time building the capacity of local NGOs to manage the cash for work and cash grant modalities. Building the capacity of the local NGOs was time intensive, but is bearing fruit as UNDP is partnering once again with these NGOs in Al Dour and Mkeishifah for small-scale livelihoods interventions. However, identifying

**After months of displacement, 25 year-old Ayad: "UNDP helped restart the life of my family in Tikrit".**



**With the support of FFIS, Ayad's café now provides a valuable source of income for his family**

*For 25 year-old Ayad, the café he owns in the city of Tikrit, in Salah al-Din Governorate in Iraq, with his three brothers is the realization of a life-long dream and a valuable source of income and stability for his family.*

*After months of displacement in search of safety, security, and a harassment-free environment, Ayad and his brothers were able to return home following the expulsion of ISIL from Tikrit. His parents and sister, however, remain trapped in an ISIL controlled territory.*

*"The Cash for Work programme enabled me to re-establish my business and helped restart the life of my family," said Ayad, who prefers to remain anonymous for security concerns. "Now I can see my community being rebuilt. Hopefully this progress will continue."*

qualified NGOs with the capacity to manage significant amounts of money for quick impact projects is a significant challenge that UNDP will have to weigh in other areas where livelihoods will be supported. Due to the substantial time required to build the capacity of the NGOs and closely supervise implementation, distribution of cash grants was slower than anticipated. While the cash grants were ultimately successful, UNDP intended the grants to be available during the initial period of shops reopening in Tikrit.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

Monitoring of the livelihoods projects was conducted through direct oversight by UNDP staff through site visits to Tikrit, as well as weekly monitoring of cash for work teams by the embedded UNDP liaison officer. UNDP is in the process of hiring a third party monitoring company, which will better monitor and evaluate the impact of livelihoods projects in benefitting communities. Monitoring will also ensure cash exchanges continue to be conducted fairly and securely as UNDP significantly scales up its activities throughout the four liberated governorates.

#### ***Activity 2.3 Capacity support (Window 3)***

In Salah al-Din, a UNDP-contracted Liaison Officer continued to support planning, implementation, and monitoring of ongoing stabilization activities. The expert has served essential functions during the procurement and implementation phases, notably facilitating oversight committees for the Directorates of Water, Electricity, and Health to oversee and monitor projects. The officer also has monitored the livelihoods projects in Salah al-Din. During the next quarter, UNDP will work more closely with the Governorate officials to determine what additional expertise may be required. Plans to build the Governor's capacity to conduct stabilization planning and coordination was challenged

by the political leadership changes; however, UNDP is working more closely with other Governorate officials and Provincial Council members to determine what critical skills are lacking.

#### ***Activity 2.4 Community reconciliation (Window 4)***

UNDP began the initial implementation phase of community reconciliation activities during the reporting period. Following conflict analyses, focus group studies, and civil society consultations conducted by the FFIS Community Reconciliation Expert during Quarter 3, Tikrit and Yathrib were selected for initial Window 4 activities in Salah al-Din. Tikrit was identified as an area of intervention due to longstanding tribal conflicts exacerbated by the recent fighting, sectarian tensions between some Sunni Arab tribes and the predominantly Shi'a Popular Mobilization Forces, and, critically, the tremendous population movement due to the occupation and subsequent expulsion of ISIL. Yathrib was also identified as an area of high community tension preventing 10,000 families from returning due to hostility between the Sunni and Shi'a tribes exacerbated by the onslaught of ISIL.

The NGO Sanad was the main implementing partner operating in Tikrit and Yathrib. The project is designed to establish platforms for meaningful engagement among communities, including returnees and IDPs. The project also aims to have an impact on peaceful coexistence of communities in Yathrib and Tikrit, and on establishing local capacities for collaborative problem solving.

During the reporting period, UNDP and Sanad carried out a series of structured interviews with different stakeholders in Tikrit and Yathrib to develop an understanding of the issues, and to identify, formulate, and propose solutions to facilitate the return of

several tribes. Sanad developed a questionnaire for individual interviews, and subsequently interviewed 158 individuals in October and November in Baghdad, Erbil, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Salah al-Din. Of the 158 individuals, 110 were from Tikrit (10 females and 100 males) and 48 from Yathrib (three females and 45 males). Interviewees included members of the Provincial Council, Tikrit and Yathrib municipal councils, the Tribal Affairs Committee, and tribal leaders. Based on these consultations, Sanad integrated four output indicators developed by UNDP to measure the impact for their products, producing the following baselines:

- % decrease in individuals feeling distrust within the community (baseline at 40% feel distrust);
- % increase in individuals feeling adequately safe (baseline at 43% fear of security forces controlling the area)
- % decrease in individuals exposed to ethnically-driven or revenge-related violence in the last month (baseline at 53% would fear revenge would occur post-return)
- % increase in individuals who believe reconciliation is effective (baseline at 42% believe reconciliation is essential to occur prior to return)

The structured interviews resulted in a better understanding of key social issues IDPs face when returning to Tikrit and Yathrib. Findings of the initial phases of the project are available in separate reporting.

In the second phase of the project, Sanad organized two focus groups and workshops in Sulaymaniyah on 21 November 2015 to establish communication among the different stakeholders from Tikrit and Yathrib. The workshops facilitated a participatory

approach among the different stakeholders to address restorative justice issues, reconciliation requirements, and intra-community conflicts. The stakeholders reached a consensus about immediate and mid-term solutions to the current crisis that prevents the return of IDPs. The workshops on 21 November included the leaders of Yathrib and Tikrit, and representatives of the National Reconciliation Commission and the Stabilization Committee from the Prime Minister's Office. Further, a commissioner from the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission and members from the Salah al-Din Provincial Council also participated.

The final phase of the project, which will establish a local mechanism for reconciliation, will be reported in the following Quarter 1 2016 progress report.

During the reporting period, renewed tensions between Sunni and Shia IDP communities in Yathrib led to adjustments to UNDP's community reconciliation intervention. The Salah al-Din and local authorities attempted to facilitate the return of Sunni IDPs to Yathrib by paying blood compensation to victims of neighboring Shia tribes. The subsequent violence demonstrated the critical need for training of local and federal authorities in dialogue and mediation techniques to manage conflicts between communities affected by ISIL occupation.

In order to proceed with the return of IDPs to Yathrib, officials must diagnose the necessary requirements of the returnees, and work to achieve these requirements to facilitate the returns. Further, there must be a foundation for reconciliation between the conflicting parties prior to the return to avoid any further escalation. Nonetheless, UNDP and Sanad were able to closely monitor these developments on a daily basis and adjust the project strategy in response to these developments.

## Anbar



The most significant development during this reporting period was the liberation of Ramadi, announced by Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi on 28 December 2015. Iraqi Security Forces are continuing to address the remaining ISIL fighters in the city and remove mines and improved explosive devices. UNDP does not commence activities on the ground until an area has been cleared by the National Operations Center. This can take some weeks or months to occur. On 30 December, the Prime Minister issued an Executive Order establishing a High Committee for the Stabilization and Reconstruction of Ramadi, which will be chaired by the Governor of Anbar. The Committee will include representatives from various ministries and will initially focus on securing the city from IEDs, and reinstating basic services to lay the conditions for the stabilization of Ramadi. As requested by the Prime Minister, UNDP will support the efforts of the Governor and the High Committee.

Stabilization activities in Ramadi present a daunting challenge. The needs in Ramadi will be considerable due to the size of the city and the scale of destruction. The majority of Ramadi's 500,000 residents have been displaced, and the remaining 5,000-20,000 residents have been kept captive by ISIL within the city for an extended period of time with little access to basic services. To begin addressing this challenge and ap-

ply one of the key lessons learned in Tikrit, UNDP supported the Anbar Governorate to conduct detailed advanced stabilization planning ahead of liberation. This included a preliminary needs assessment process; dedicating a Stabilization Advisor to the Anbar Governor's office to boost its stabilization planning capacity; initiating the procurement process to preposition equipment; initiating outreach to NGOs for livelihoods; and building rapport with the Anbar Governor's lead on community reconciliation.

### **Output 1: Rapid stabilization and recovery assessments are carried out with local authorities, UN agencies, and civil society actors.**

Using the established process for needs assessments used from other areas of FFIS engagement, on 16 November 2015, FFIS moderated a stabilization needs assessment workshop with key stakeholders for Ramadi to prioritize activities. Fifty-one participants contributed, included the Governor of Anbar, the Provincial Council, the Mayor of Ramadi, members of the Ramadi local council, governorate and district-level technical departments, as well as representatives of civil society. Two women also participated in the prioritization workshop. In the lead up to the workshop line ministry officials worked to gather baseline data on the pre-conflict footprint of basic services, as well

as to assess the status of infrastructure as of November 2015.

The preliminary assessment process for Ramadi differed from other needs assessments in that it took place prior to liberation. While advance planning ahead of liberation is one of the key lessons learned from FFIS activities in Tikrit, it also poses its own challenges. Given the present security situation, officials have had only limited access to Ramadi, which reduced their ability to provide a high confidence preliminary assessment. Further, it is likely that infrastructure will have been further damaged in the period between the assessment and liberation. The preliminary needs assessment identified priorities provisionally costing \$127 million to address water, health, education, electricity, and municipal services. While UNDP has not been able to assess these figures due to security constraints, accounts from civilians and social media corroborate that damage is extensive and substantial. A review of the findings will be required after Ramadi is fully cleared.

## **Output 2: Iraqi Government is supported to address the immediate stabilization and recovery needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the sustainable return of IDPs**

### ***Activity 2.1 Public work and light infrastructure rehabilitation (Window 1)***

Security conditions have precluded light infrastructure rehabilitation in Ramadi during the reporting period. However, given the strategic priority of the city, the Steering Committee endorsed the repositioning of Window 1 equipment. Local authorities have not been able to fully assess the scale of the damage; however, UNDP began procurement to reposition equipment based on consultations with the An-

bar technical departments, the Governor's recommendations, and UNDP experience in other liberated areas. Equipment is listed in Annex I.

Based on experiences in Tikrit and other liberated areas, UNDP is planning based on assumptions that electrical generators and ambulances are likely nonfunctioning, destroyed, and removed by ISIL prior to liberation. Further, UNDP learned from Salah al-Din and Ninewah that electricity is commonly prioritized over other sectors during the stabilization period. The Governor of Anbar has provided a storage facility in the Anbar Command Center, located in Amariyat al Fallujah until the equipment can be moved into Ramadi.

The next phase of Window 1 activities will be developed in Quarter 1 following further consultations and a continued needs assessment process, which is dependent on security conditions. According to official reports and discussions with the technical departments, the infrastructure damage is significant.

### ***Activity 2.2 Livelihoods support (Window 2)***

Due to security conditions, UNDP did not begin any livelihoods work in Ramadi. During the reporting period, UNDP activities were limited to building a network of potential partners for livelihoods and assessing the capacity of NGOs to work in Ramadi. During Quarter 1, UNDP will select implementing partners and begin livelihoods work as security conditions allow.

### ***Activity 2.3 Capacity support (Window 3)***

Anbar was the focus of Window 3 activities during Quarter 4. The international Stabilization Advisor began work during the re-

porting period, and has been embedded in the Governor's office to support Ramadi stabilization efforts. This includes advising the Governor on stabilization activities, notably post-liberation interventions, civil-military planning, and prepositioning equipment for Ramadi. According to the Performance Tracking Matrix (Annex II), UNDP aims to facilitate the production of comprehensive stabilization plans for each of the governorates. The Stabilization Advisor is building upon the original stabilization strategy UNDP helped the Anbar Governor produce in the July 2015, and is working with the Governor's office to operationalize this strategy.

UNDP hired a liaison officer, who begins work in early January 2016. The liaison officer will work directly with the Governor's office and with the Control Cell, and will coordinate stabilization activities in Ramadi once security conditions allow. The officer will also monitor stabilization activities with NGOs and contractors, and report the progress to UNDP project management.

After working with the Governor's office to assess their requirements, UNDP is in the process of hiring officials to further bolster Anbar's capacity. First, to increase the Governor's coordination capacity, FFIS is in the process of hiring a Special Assistant to fo-

cus on high level strategic and policy issues required to allow the Governor to develop timely and efficient stabilization activities coordinated across governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders. Second, to increase the ability of the Anbar Governor to design, manage, and support implementation of the Anbar communications strategy, UNDP is recruiting a Communications Specialist to work full-time with the Office of the Anbar Governor. This will be with a view to influence the stabilization agenda, to propose public and media outreach, and to link the Government with the public during the stabilization phase. The Communications Specialist will be hired and begin work in the next quarter.

#### ***Activity 2.4 Community reconciliation (Window 4)***

By the end of Quarter 4, UNDP was in the early stages of engaging the Governor on implementation of his community reconciliation and tribal outreach strategy. UNDP has been supporting the Governor's Advisor on Tribal Affairs, who is charged with developing and carrying out tribal reconciliation in Anbar. Reconciliation in Ramadi is a key pillar of the Governor's stabilization strategy.



## NINEWAH

In November, the FFIS Steering Committee endorsed the UNDP engagement in Sinuni (in Sinjar district), Rabiya (in Telafar district), and Sinjar city. UNDP has been working with the Ninewah Governor's office and technical directorates, temporarily located in Dohuk and Erbil. The International Area Coordinator for Ninewah has been advising the Governorate officials, notably the Deputy Governor and the recently appointed Governor. Other technical advisors have been hired for Ninewah, and are facilitating the implementation of Window 1 and Window 4 activities.

Sinjar city was liberated on 13 November, following four days of intense coalition airstrikes in support Peshmergha ground forces and a range of other forces including PKK and Yazidi groups. The predominantly Yazidi population of Sinuni and Sinjar of around 275,000 has been completely displaced due to the catastrophic occupation by ISIL. The group kidnapped, sold, and forced into marriage or killed 4,000 Yazidi women and girls, and killed countless men in a matter of weeks. Sinjar city is of strategic importance due to its proximity to Mosul and its location along a highway to the Syrian city of Raqqa. In advance of civilian returns, the Ninewah Governorate has deployed technical staff to the city to assess damages. A new mayor has been appointed and has established a temporary office near the destroyed municipal building. Although the FFIS Steering Committee has endorsed support for an assessment of Sinjar, UNDP does not have access to the city, as the situation remains volatile as various armed groups vie for control. In addition to

security concerns, UNDP is closely monitoring trends of IDPs return to Sinjar, which will inform the nature of FFIS intervention.

### **Output 1: Rapid local stabilization and recovery assessments are carried out with local authorities, UN agencies, and civil society actors.**

UNDP conducted two field missions to re-assess and monitor stabilization in the four liberated areas of Ninewah. The missions conducted in Quarter 4 improved UNDP's understanding of changing dynamics on the ground in Rabiya and Sinuni (Sinjar district) over the last seven months, during which returns have increased, particularly to Rabiya. The two missions conducted in November and December led UNDP to publish a report with the updated findings. The report supports the Governor of Ninewah's efforts to coordinate resources for liberated areas, as well as inform future FFIS activities.

In consultation with UNDP and using the FFIS methodology, a stabilization needs assessment for Sinjar city was initiated by the Governor of Ninewah in December. A team of technical staff from the technical directorates has been deployed to the city. They plan to complete data collection in early January, which will be followed by a UNDP assessment verification mission. Initial reports indicate that approximately 70 to 75 percent of the city has been badly damaged or destroyed by airstrikes, while the city is riddled with IEDs planted by ISIL prior to the retreat. The return of the displaced Yazidi community is hampered by many factors,

including the low level of trust in state authorities to provide security.

**Output 2: Iraqi Government is supported to address the immediate stabilization and recovery needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the sustainable return of IDPs.**

***Activity 2.1 Public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation (Window 1)***

Following the Steering Committee's endorsement of FFIS activities in Sinuni and Ra-biya, and an assessment of Sinjar city, UNDP immediately activated the implementation of the top priority project during the reporting period: renovation of the Sinuni hospital and provision of the hospital's medical equipment. The hospital was prioritized during the needs assessment conducted in May 2015, which reported that Sinuni endured the most significant damage. The following is a condensed baseline for liberated areas of Ninewah included in the report, excluding Sinjar:

- 24 of 26 health facilities were damaged and a majority looted;
- 112 schools needed rehabilitation, and only 40 percent of children were able to attend;
- 3 water treatment plans could not purify water, and 38 of 157 wells functioned;
- 50km of feeder line electricity cables and 210 distribution transformers were looted or destroyed;
- 30 local authorities were damaged, 22 of which were totally destroyed;
- 4,166 houses were totally destroyed which prevented families from returning;

Rehabilitation of the Sinuni hospital began in November and was completed in December. Most of the medical equipment

has been delivered, save three items to be delivered in Quarter 1. The hospital has the facilities to provide comprehensive medical care for the population in the vicinity of Sinuni. Prior to renovation, the nearest accident and emergency unit and surgery facility was in Dohuk, a four-hour drive away. The hospital currently services 17,000 people who either stayed on the northern slope of Sinjar Mountain or who have been returned to the lowland villages. Once the displaced population returns, the hospital could serve up to 75,000 residents.

While the hospital rehabilitation is completed, UNDP expended considerable effort coordinating needs for medical equipment between the Governorate technical department and Baghdad. Further, selection of the medical equipment was influenced by Ninewah Provincial Councilmembers rather than health experts, reinforcing the importance of balancing well-intentioned public wishes with technical specifications. Coordination issues further highlighted the criticality of employing a health specialist to monitor and advise on health-related activities, and work with all stakeholders in developing sensible priorities.

UNDP expects to implement more Window 1 activities in 2016. The liberation of Sinjar may open opportunities to rehabilitate light infrastructure; however, it remains to be seen if civilians will return to the city. Enduring security threats due to its proximity to the front line along with issues of housing, land and property may significantly delay returns. Critically, the political environment is tense and requires dialogue and mediation.

***Activity 2.2 Livelihoods support (Window 2)***

UNDP initiated the early stages of livelihoods activities in Ninewah during the

reporting period. The needs assessment for Ninewah detailed the significant livelihoods support required by families in liberated areas. Most households in Sinuni and Rabiya are rural agricultural-based communities that rely on grain, wheat, and barley production during the winter season, and vegetables and fruits during the summer season for income, as well as animal husbandry. Since the crisis, agricultural production has been reduced by 25 percent due to lack of labor, explosive remnants of war, lack of tools and equipment, and lack of agricultural inputs. The inaccessibility to the traditional market in Mosul is also a significant constraint. Silos and irrigation systems have also been damaged.

To support livelihoods in agricultural areas, UNDP is implementing a project to increase food availability and enhance rural household income among conflict-affected population in Rabiya by providing fertilizers which are no longer available on the local market. UNDP has partnered with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to implement a \$500,000 project through the municipality's existing community self-help scheme. This process allows for wealthier farmers to "loan" seeds to poorer families so that all can sow at least some of their land. By tying into this scheme, UNDP and FAO will provide the much-needed fertilizer for the crops. More than 1,700 families will benefit from the project resulting in the village of Rabiya re-establishing its agricultural livelihoods base.

UNDP also initiated a cash for work project, which will provide necessary income to households in Rabiya. The cash for work project will benefit the entire community by cleaning rubble and waste, and conducting light repairs to make for a cleaner, safer environment. UNDP selected the implementing partner, the French Red Cross (FRC), who will implement the cash for work pro-

ject for a budget of around \$300,000. Implementation began on 1 December with the assessment and project design. Cash for work activities will begin in Quarter 1, and continue through 31 March. The cash for work will target 200 households over the course of four months, creating approximately 8,000 daily job opportunities. The program aims to support large families, youth, and women, notably single female heads of household and households with pregnant or breastfeeding women. A local NGO, Tahreer, will ensure that interventions benefitting individual families are well targeted, with clear and transparent criteria to ensure that interventions support social cohesion and avoid inadvertently triggering any form of social tension.

### ***Activity 2.3 Capacity support (Window 3)***

UNDP continued to support the capacity of the Ninewah Governorate with an international Area Coordinator for Ninewah, who has provided significant technical support for stabilization planning and implementation for the new Governor of Ninewah. The new Governor arrived in Ninewah only a few weeks prior to the liberation of Sinjar; the Area Coordinator has advised the Governor on his response to Sinjar's liberation especially in coordinating the basic service sectors' post-liberation response. The Area Coordinator conducted two missions to Sinuni and Rabiya during the reporting period and produced an updated stabilization assessment seven months after the original was drafted, enabling the Coordinator to advise the Governor on stabilization given recent changes. The Area Coordinator has been working closely with the new Governor to develop the Ninewah stabilization plan and during the next quarter prepare plans for Mosul.

UNDP hired a medical officer to advise the Health Directorate and facilitate UNDP ac-

tivities. UNDP also hired an electrical engineer to advise on the technical requirements for reviving electricity in liberated areas.

In the next quarter, UNDP plans to continue discussions with the Governor of Ninewah regarding potential capacity-building support, including an implementation and monitoring officer.

#### **Activity 2.4 Community reconciliation (Window 4)**

In Quarter 4, UNDP began implementation of the second phase of the community reconciliation projects that were initiated in Quarter 3. The second phase was comprised of two events, called Multi-Stakeholder Process and Community-Based Dialogue, Mediation, and Reconciliation in Ninewah. Two NGOs, Un Ponte Par (UPP) and PATRIR, were UNDP's implementing partners with overall objectives to:

- Strengthen the capacity of local civil society organizations and community leadership to implement effective mediation, dialogue, and reconciliation processes to improve inter-community relations and prevent violent incidents;
- Implement community-level dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation processes which have a measureable impact on improving community relations and strengthening capacities to handle conflicts and prevent incidents of violence.

The first phase included selection of a reference group to recommend participants for the second phase of the project. The reference group included local and international NGOs addressing interethnic and intercommunity relations, minority rights, IDPs, return and reconciliation between

communities. The participants identified by the reference group underwent Dialogue, Mediation, and Reconciliation (DMR) and Multi-Stakeholder Process (MSP) training on social cohesion, reconciliation, and return to local communities in Ninewah.

During the second phase of the project, UPP/PATRIR conducted several trainings to develop facilitators' capacity to enable community reconciliation processes. First, 27 participants (from 11 local organizations and eight international organizations) partook in the joint MSP to support social cohesion, coexistence, and peacebuilding measures. The MSP trained facilitators over several sessions to analyze situations in their local communities, identify key areas of concern, and design workshops aimed at addressing these issues through facilitated dialogue, while tackling the next steps forward akin to restorative justice. The MSP was held prior to and after the DMR training.

Second, UPP/PATRIR followed with two five-day workshops for facilitators from the Multi-Stakeholder Process on designing community-based DMR proposals for their communities. The workshops developed conflict monitoring and evaluation frameworks based on stakeholder inputs, as well as trained participants on joint planning and participatory design. The workshop also included two sessions on developing indicators, targets, and participatory monitoring and evaluation processes for community-based DMR projects. The proposal designs addressed specific disputes causing tensions in their local areas or dealt with thematic issues around which communities could gather, developing broader understanding and fostering attitudes of tolerance.

Twenty-one facilitators participated in the DMR workshops, representing all ethnic

and religious communities of the area. In Quarter 1 of 2016, participants will implement their projects designed during the workshops in Rabiya and Sinuni. These projects will be carried out under the umbrella of UPP and PATRIR, who vetted the participants through consultations and the two workshops. The UNDP project team also reviewed the proposals and, where necessary, provided advice to the facilitators regarding implementation.

Women were strongly represented in all events, including 55 percent of women participants in the Multi-Stakeholder Process training (15 out of 27) and 48 percent of women participants in the DMR training (10 out of 21 participants).

Leading up to the design of the project, UPP and PATRIR found that organizations in Ninewah lacked strong foundations and capacity to operate as civil-society organizations in community-based processes, including limited understanding or agreement on social cohesion concepts. However, this was noted both as a challenge and as an opportunity to engage and identify commonalities and opportunities. The Ninewah Provincial Council affirmed its full participation, partnership, and agreement in the project and nominated two members to the reference group and 14 participants to the DMR workshop. Local authorities from Rabiya and Sinuni expressed their commitment to the projects, identifying their importance their communities, and requested partnership and readiness to provide full support and cooperation to the project and implementing civil society partners.

Media covered the projects positively and helped promote these efforts. A journalist from Radio Sawa came to the Community Based Mediation, Dialogue, and Reconciliation in Ninewah workshops to interview participants and discuss how they can help


promote the project's goals and objectives. The Project Coordinator was interviewed on Radio Sawa and Radio Al Salam about the situation Ninewah and the project's activities. One of the participants published an article on Lalish, a local news outlet. The project began working with participants to develop an ambitious media outreach campaign for the next phase of the project to be conducted in Quarter 1.

A key mechanism for the project was the establishment of the reference group, created prior to the start of the project with representatives from key organizations, UN, and the Ninewah Provincial Council. Their role is to provide oversight of the project and input to development of targets for local DMR processes, evaluation framework, and contacts with relevant stakeholders. They provided support by identifying participants for the programs, improving coherence and synergy across multiple peacebuilding projects, and strengthening links for sharing lessons learned from projects by local partners. In addition, the Multi-Stakeholder Processes at the start and end of the project has helped embed the project in the broader efforts to strengthen peacebuilding, mediation, dialogue, and reconciliation in Ninewah, and served as a critical consultative mechanism.

These two important consultative mechanisms ensured that UNDP has had the necessary support to implement activities in the highly contested and tense post-liberation environment. While uncertain about the merits of grassroots peacebuilding approaches at the start of the project, the Reference Group has shown significant enthusiasm throughout the initiative, having seen the results of workshops and engaged with facilitators. Several members recommended that in a subsequent phase of the initiative, the same actors could take a greater role in supporting and working with the facilitators around local disputes.

UNDP and its implementing partners have engaged with other international NGOs such as PAX to develop greater coordination mechanisms to avoid repetitive efforts and ensure continuity of the achievements made during the various phases of the FFIS activities. Discussions between UNDP, international, and local partners have highlighted several opportunities for longer-term community reconciliation approaches, particularly in light of the possible liberation of other areas such as Tal Afar and Mosul. While the sustainability of the Ninewah FFIS project is higher than initially anticipated, it is still tentative. One key recommendation is to provide more training and support to the facilitators, as well as work with local government to outline a strategy for local ownership of the facilitator network.

Overall, the project demonstrated the merits of a particular model for addressing inter-communal tensions in this part of Iraq, combining the challenges of post-conflict issues and longer structural problems particular to Ninewah. Workshops addressed a number of key disputes that were raising tensions and also promoted understanding. As reported by facilitators and participants, these workshops played a key role in reducing tensions in local communities around specific issues. Most importantly, the project renewed a belief in the importance of community-level peacebuilding activities amongst both facilitators and local government officials, both of which want to continue efforts.



UNDP efforts in Diyala are in the initial stages following endorsement of the Steering Committee to work in Al Saadiyah in November. UNDP conducted a site visit to Al Saadiyah to assess the stabilization needs of the town. The site visit report was published in December, and found that approximately 20 percent of the pre-conflict population had returned to the city. While the destruction is not as extensive as Tikrit or Al Dour, basic services have been clearly affected by fighting and looting. Further, the town would benefit significantly from livelihoods programs such as cash for work and community reconciliation interventions to ease palpable communal tensions.

UNDP conducted mediation and reconcili-

ation training activities with IDPs from Diyala displaced to camps in Suleymaniya. The project's aim is to improve social cohesion between IDPs and host communities through facilitated dialogues to develop joint community projects. Secondly, the project intends to establish mechanisms by which communal problems between IDPs and host communities can be mitigated. The primary implementing partner was the Iraqi Center for Negotiation Skills and Conflict Management, which worked through local NGOs, REACH, CSRO, and GYO to reach three IDP camps. In December, the Iraqi Center recruited 31 volunteers from the IDP camps to be trained in dialogue and mediation. Twenty-nine percent of the volunteers were women. The trained dialogue facilita-

tors co-led nine dialogue workshops in the three training camps, which included 130 volunteers, including women. Women's participation varied from camp to camp due to cultural sensitivities, but the NGOs encouraged further participation through discussions with family members. The mediation training and dialogues furthered the development of a mediation center in one of the camps, and in another camp those trained negotiated with camp management and security personnel to gain access to the host community. Overall, camp and community leaders (including women in recent dialogues) were very supportive of expanding the project beyond

the initial series of workshops, particularly with the involvement of youth and women. In addition, these activities provided an opportunity for local NGOs to establish a stronger foothold in the camp and IDP communities, opening new opportunities to further integrate IDPs in their activities. During the next reporting period, UNDP will facilitate the stabilization needs assessment with Diyala and Al Saadiyah officials to determine six month priorities. Further, UNDP is currently recruiting a national Area Coordinator to help the Diyala governorate coordinate stabilization activities, and an additional engineer to facilitate implementation of Window 1 activities.

# Project Photos

**Right:** Conditions in Salah al-Din school prior to refurbishments.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Below:** Refurbished schools in Salah al-Din.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Right:** Livelihoods teams get ready for work in Tikrit.

Photo Credit: Tikrit Youth Council





Cash for work teams at the Tikrit University entrance. Photo Credit: UNDP



**Above:** Cash for work teams cleaned over ten buildings of Tikrit University. Photo Credit: UNDP



**Above:** Rehabilitation of the water intake in Tikrit.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Right:** FFIS supplied 50 transformers, 750 poles, and 100km of cables, which were installed by the Tikrit Electricity Department.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Above:** Cash for work teams were comprised of women and youth, and painted mosques, schools, and other public buildings.

Photo Credit: Tikrit Youth Council



**Above:** Rehabilitations ongoing at the Tikrit Central Water Station.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Right:** Refurbishments to the Tikrit water station has supplied clean, filtered water to tens of thousands of residents. Photo credit: UNDP



Engineer inspects refurbished purification system.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Right:** Refurbished Tikrit Central Water Station. Photo credit: UNDP



Installing generators for the Tikrit Central Water Station. Credit: UNDP

**Below:** Cash for work participant cleans the halls of Tikrit University.

Photo Credit: Tikrit Youth Council





**Above:** Girls attend refurbished primary school in Tikrit.

Photo Credit: UNDP



**Left:** The Qadisiya police station before refurbishments. The interior was completely burned.

**Below:** The Qadisiya police station after refurbishment by UNDP.



**Left:** The Governor of Salah al-Din opens the renovated police station in Tikrit.

Photo credit: UNDP

# Challenges and Issues

---

Stabilization environments are inherently challenging and complex, and UNDP continues to manage such challenges in consultation with the Government of Iraq and the Steering Committee. The Risk Framework (Annex III) shared with donors during the Stabilization Task Force meetings and Technical Working Groups outlines several of these challenges, notably fluctuating security environments and protection of FFIS assets during implementation.

## Security and Political Challenges

One of the initial obstacles faced in the beginning of Quarter 4 was the disappearance of two generators (1-megawatt and 900kV) refurbished by FFIS from the Tikrit central water station. Following their disappearance on 29 September, UNDP halted all infrastructure activities in Tikrit for four weeks until the generators were returned on 27 October. The Prime Minister's Office, the Governor, and the security forces worked together to find the original generators, which were placed under additional security protection following their return. Despite this initial challenge, the end result was positive: the Prime Minister's Office and the Governor managed the incident and worked with the security forces to prevent further looting. As outlined in the Risk Framework, such looting is a known risk in a stabilization environment; however, UNDP was pleased that the Government of Iraq was able to resolve the

issue in a timely manner. Despite this four-week delay, five projects were completed in Tikrit during the reporting period.

General insecurity in the country caused delays in some Window 1 activities. The excavator acquired for the Salah al-Din Electricity Department was expected in November; however, the contractor had to delay importation through the Turkish border and divert to the port of Basra. UNDP rented an excavator to manage the work in the meantime, but it is possible that border security issues may result in delayed procurement for particular imports in the future. FFIS activities also halted in Tikrit for several days in October due to a brief period of fighting between Iraqi Security Forces and ISIL south of Tikrit. Although the Iraqi Security Forces thwarted the attempted attacks, such insecurity will continue to pose challenges for FFIS contractors.

Ethnic and sectarian politics also challenge UNDP ability to implement stabilization activities, to include conducting stabilization in disputed internal boundary areas. UNDP supports the Government in Baghdad and a unified Iraq; however, the complexities of conflict, some of which predate the ISIL occupation, have reignited ethnic tensions among Kurdish factions, as well as political tensions between the KRG and Baghdad. The Governor of Diyala has long called for UNDP stabilization support to his governo-

rate, notably the town of Al Saadiyah and the city of Jalawla. Jalawla has been the center of tension between the KRG and Baghdad due to a legacy of past Arabization policies and to a contested normalization process. These tensions have prevented IDPs from returning and complicate UNDP's ability to support the Governor's request for assistance through FFIS. These concerns were raised through the Stabilization Task Force, and the Government of Iraq assured UNDP and FFIS donors that negotiations for political settlements were ongoing. As such, the FFIS Steering Committee declined to identify Jalawla as a site for FFIS activities in Quarter 4 of 2015, but endorsed work in Al Saadiyah, where UNDP is closely monitoring returns.

Ethnic and regional tensions also complicate stabilization efforts in Sinjar. The city of Sinjar was liberated in November 2015, and the Steering Committee subsequently endorsed UNDP engagement. However, the city is under the control of at least eight armed factions, including the Kurdish Peshmergha forces who were essential in the liberation of the city from ISIL. Such factionalism following liberation fuels competition between armed groups and stokes fear in the local population. A key lesson learned from Tikrit and the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces in the post-liberation environment is the importance of deploying trusted security forces after offensive operations are completed, and clear communication to populations of who is charged with providing security. This is all the more important given the real concerns by Sinjar residents of ensuring protection if they return, given the horrific atrocities committed by ISIL especially targeting Yazidis in 2014 and the lost trust of locals with the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmergha. UNDP will require further direction and consultation from the Steering Committee, the Ninewah Governor, and Prime Minister's Office to ensure that while Peshmergha security forces

maintain security over the area, UNDP support to Sinjar will not undermine Baghdad's authority. UNDP continues to stress the criticality of detailed security transition plans with the Government of Iraq as part of the stabilization process.

Sinjar also presents an important dilemma of whether FFIS activities should be employed in areas where IDPs may not return. Interviews with IDPs from Sinjar conducted by UNDP suggest that the rate of return may be very slow, if at all, due to fears of the lack of protection from the security forces outlined above. Limited overall returns are also reflected by the technical staff required to operate and maintain rehabilitated infrastructure. Without staff, rehabilitated infrastructure and public spaces risk falling into disrepair, while equipment is at risk of looting. UNDP will monitor the rate of returns closely, and consult with the Steering Committee regarding investment in Sinjar if it is assessed that displaced persons, even with stabilization activities, will not return in sufficient numbers to justify the engagement.

Ninewah is also in the midst of a complex political situation with respect to newly liberated areas that are Disputed Border Areas, such as Rabiya and Sinuni. Salah Al Din, Kirkuk and Diyala also have disputed border areas where future FFIS interventions may face a specific set of challenges. While the Steering Committee has endorsed FFIS activities in disputed areas such as Rabiya and Sinuni (in Sinjar district), which are legislatively controlled by the Federal Government of Iraq, the KRG also maintains considerable authority and access. Given the centrality of working with local Government partners in the FFIS model, this bifurcation of government authority has impacted FFIS operations such as in the rehabilitation of Sinuni hospital. For example, UNDP site visits were delayed due to disputes over Dohuk or Ninewah Governor's facilitation of security for FFIS medical officer during the visit.

Enduring ISIL threats also challenge UNDP's ability to implement FFIS activities in liberated areas. Baiji was liberated in October 2015, and the Steering Committee and Governor of Salah al-Din endorsed engagement. UNDP has been unable to conduct site visits or a needs assessment with the Salah al-Din Governorate due to ISIL's persistent threat to the district. Further, the road to Baiji from Tikrit is also under ISIL threat, preventing Salah al-Din and local officials from traveling to Baiji. While the continued security threat has delayed implementation of FFIS activities, the situation is expected to improve in Quarter 1 of 2016, according to Government sources. Ramadi will also likely endure a similar pattern, where liberation will be followed by probing attacks by ISIL. The security situations in Baiji and Ramadi highlight the importance of delineating between liberation of an area from ISIL and clearance of an area of IEDs and enduring threats so that civilians can return. Probing or asymmetric attacks may continue, as has been seen in Salah al-Din, and should be factored into implementation timelines. UNDP will continue to rely on the National Operations Center to determine when these and other areas are cleared and sufficiently safe for FFIS engagement.

There are a number of stabilization issues not directly addressed by FFIS that are crucial to promoting stability following liberation. As described in the Quarter 3 report, provision of justice, rule of law, and security following the expulsion of ISIL are essential stabilization requirements upon which FFIS activities are dependent. During Quarter 4, UNDP learned another major challenge to stabilization not directly addressed by FFIS activities is the issue of compensation for damaged and destroyed homes. The Government has not been able to meet the enormous demand of compensation claims resulting from the crisis. During the preliminary needs assessment workshop for Ramadi, all officials and civil society present

stressed the need for temporary housing provision in light of for the immense level of destruction to personal homes. Compensation, in the context of reconciliation but also relating to damage and destruction of property, has also featured highly in discussions with Anbaris, as well as with residents of still displaced Sinuni. Compensation is also important for social cohesion and community reconciliation, demonstrated by the escalated tensions in Yathrib and other parts of Salah al-Din. Property damage is especially sensitive in areas where homes were destroyed after battles with ISIL ended. Compensation should be a more substantive aspect of the national discussion and planning for stabilization, reconciliation, and transitional justice. While this issue extends well beyond the writ of FFIS, discontent around compensation has the potential to impact FFIS' ability to carry out its mandate.

#### Operational Challenges

The Steering Committee is an essential oversight and consultative body for FFIS activities; however, the delay in holding the first meeting also led to delays in beginning work in some liberated areas of Ninewah. This is in part due to the overall process of standing up a new project and new procedures. The Steering Committee helped clarify FFIS activities in Ninewah, some of which were requested by the Government prior to official endorsement.

Government of Iraq customs and tax requirements have delayed completion of several projects during the reporting period. Ambulances for Tikrit arrived in Iraq in November, but have been delayed by Customs. The contractor and UNDP are working with the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Affairs to attain the appropriate clearances.

The technical departments' coordination and capacity to conduct assessments for FFIS activities requires significant assistance

from UNDP staff. Bills of quantity had to be adjusted on several occasions and required UNDP engineers to work hand in hand with the technical departments to ensure the work proposed is accurate.

The capacity of local NGOs to implement livelihoods activities, notably handling cash for small business grants, is limited. Building the capacity of NGOs to conduct such activities is labor intensive, and may result in using both national and international NGOs in large areas of engagement.

Identifying cash for work and supplying small business grants targeting women proved challenging given cultural mores around women's employment. Expanding women's opportunities in Window 2 activities will require more creative approaches to targeting women directly and indirectly, such as identifying projects specifically geared towards women-friendly activities, or indirectly through participant criteria that supports vulnerable women through male members of the household. This may have already occurred during the initial cash for work activities in Salah al-Din, and UNDP will need to refine reporting requirements with implementing partners.

Implementing Window 3 activities continued to be a challenge. In part this is due to the early stages of building trust between UNDP and the Governors' offices. UNDP has shown itself to be a reliable partner in Salah al-Din, and recent engagement with the Anbar governorate for stabilization planning has also built trust. UNDP capacity as-

sistance to Anbar has illustrated the added value of providing advisors and experts during the planning phases, and UNDP is learning lessons from Window 3 activities for Anbar to apply to other governorates. In Ninewah, the appointment of a new Governor in November also required time to build trust and understanding with UNDP, as well as time for the Governor to assess what support he required. The delays are also in part due to internal FFIS staffing capacity. To address this, UNDP has adjusted staff responsibilities and assigned a lead specifically for Window 3.

The needs for community reconciliation are significant, and will continue to be a priority for stabilization. The PMF in Salah al-Din attempted to negotiate the return of Sunni IDPs to Yathrib despite high tensions between the Sunni and Shi'a populations in the southern sub-district. The negotiations resulted in an escalation of tensions between the two communities, especially since it was broadly seen as lacking transparency and was not conducted in a manner that would optimize opportunities for reconciliation. UNDP planned to implement a community reconciliation project in Yathrib, designed to ease tensions between these communities; however, the intervention as planned was thwarted and forced to adjust the project due to PMF methods of handling returns. UNDP will need to reexamine what can be achieved in the limited six-month timeframe of FFIS stabilization interventions. This includes an assessment of potential partnerships with other UN agencies and projects involved in community reconciliation.

## Lessons Learned

---

While UNDP requires the National Operations Center to declare an area clear before activities on the ground can begin, UNDP

experience with Ramadi suggests that pre-planning and engagement prior to liberation is possible. Prepositioning equipment

for Window 1 activities, conducting preliminary needs assessments, and supporting the Governorate with human capital has helped the Government prepare for Ramadi. Nonetheless, the dependence of FFIS activities on security operations makes it impossible for UNDP and the Government to have fully reliable information in detailed advance planning. As mentioned, the ongoing conflict meant that Government officials had only limited or indirect access to Ramadi during this reporting period, reducing their ability to provide a high confidence assessment of the state of key facilities. Further, infrastructure that is assessed at a given point in the ongoing liberation and clearance operations may receive further damage in the period between the assessment and the completion of clearing operations.

This “planning paradox” requires UNDP and the Government to use planning assumptions (such as predicting that most moveable assets, like ambulances, will be stolen or destroyed by ISIL), and remaining open to update stabilization plans as increasingly better information emerges as officials can access areas of interest. One helpful development during the reporting period was the establishment of the Anbar Governor’s office in the International Zone of Baghdad. The office has facilitated contact between Governorate officials and members of the International Community, including UNDP, and facilitated stronger partnership in preparing for Ramadi. Further, the office has greatly eased the logistics and security considerations involved in embedding an international Stabilization Advisor during the reporting period, who has worked within the Governor’s office to support Ramadi stabilization efforts. The ability to have close and daily contact between Anbar governorate officials and UNDP staff have greatly

improved the effectiveness of stabilization planning.

The disappearance of the generators in Tikrit were indicative of the very real threats to security of FFIS rehabilitated and procured assets, and demonstrative of the Government’s ability to positively respond. The halting of Window 1 activities for four weeks also reinforced the message that such acts would not be tolerated by UNDP or donors supporting FFIS. UNDP continues to be vigilant about the safety of such equipment, and has applied this experience to Ramadi as UNDP prepositions equipment in advance of the district’s liberation.

Stabilization activities in the health and electricity sectors requires specialized skills to advise on selection, implementation, and monitoring of the projects. UNDP hired a national health specialist to advise the Health Directorates and UNDP on prioritizing needs based on stabilization principles rather than development aspirations. Experience in Salah al-Din and Ninewah exemplify the importance of technical capacity support with Health Directorates, as well as the need to build the capacity of the governorates to coordinate needs and efforts leading up to and following the needs assessment process. For example, the Salah al-Din health officials prioritized the pharmacy department as a stabilization priority, but did not prioritize certain storage sections also necessary for medicines. Similarly, the Health Directorate prioritized rehabilitation of five public health clinics in Tikrit without specifying a need for medical equipment and furniture. These issues are in part a result of lack of capacity and coordination at the governorate level, but also a result of lacking technical expertise as well as independent monitoring mechanisms by UNDP. To address these

issues, UNDP hired a health specialist to advise on prioritize of the governorates, build the capacity of the Health Directorates to specify priorities that assist the population, and plan for additional needs to staff the facilities.

For electricity, UNDP faced similar delays in the technical reviews for major electricity procurements such as mobile power stations. Such reviews require technical knowledge beyond UNDP civil engineers' areas of expertise. As with the health officer, UNDP hired an electrical engineer in Quarter 4 to conduct technical reviews of the mobile power stations and advise UNDP and the governorates on needs and implementa-

tion. This will be especially important to advise the Anbar Governor and Directorate of Electricity with mobile power stations and generators in Ramadi.

These issues also highlight the importance of an independent third party monitoring and evaluation entity to oversee projects during the implementation period. UNDP has developed terms of reference and is expecting to recruit a company to monitor Windows 1 and 2 activities beginning in Quarter 1. The monitoring and evaluation entity will also help UNDP develop and track more sophisticated indicators of success, to include qualitative reporting from the beneficiaries on UNDP projects provided.

## Future Plans

---

During Quarter 1, UNDP will close out all activities in Tikrit, Al Dour, and Mkeishifah, and prepare to transition these projects to fellow UN agencies and UNDP projects such as the Iraqi Crisis Recovery and Resilience program (ICRRP). A detailed transition plan is being formulated, of which Tikrit will be the first test case. UNDP will complete the initial stages of prepositioning equipment for Ramadi, and plans to begin Window 2 livelihoods activities in neighborhoods deemed ready by the National Operations Center and the Governor. Window 4 activities will also begin in Ramadi, with further conflict analysis and identification of community reconciliation partners. UNDP will initiate the first stage of activities in Diyala following a needs assessment process. In Ninewah, UNDP will continue its activities in Rabiya and Sinuni and focus strongly on Sinjar district, once political issues have matured. Should the security and political conditions allow, UNDP intends to initiate work in Baiji during Quarter 1 of 2016.

UNDP is expanding its staff to include two additional engineers (specifically dedicated to Diyala and Anbar), an additional livelihoods expert, a liaison officer for Anbar, Ninewah, and Diyala. Window 3 activities will also expand to include more direct coordination and planning support to each of the governorates, as well as communications specialist and a special assistant to the Governor of Anbar.

As FFIS operational tempo ramps up, the hiring of the third party monitoring and evaluation company is of utmost priority. UNDP expects the company to be hired and operational within the next reporting period. UNDP will also have detailed transition strategies for each area of engagement, and work with the governorates to ensure smooth transition of FFIS stabilization activities to appropriate entities in the Government and/or other international agencies.

# Financial Section (as of 31 Dec 2015)

**Table 1: Funding Overview: contributions and expenditures**

Donor	Commitment (Currency of the Agreement)	Received (Currency of the Agreement)	To be received (currency of agreement)	Received as of 5 Jan 2015 (USD)
USAID	USD 15,300,000	USD 8,300,000	USD 7,000,000	USD 8,300,000
Germany	EUR 11,000,000	EUR 6,000,000	EUR 5,000,000	USD 6,415,865
DFID	GBP 2,000,000	GBP 1,000,000	GBP 750,000	USD 1,921,089
Slovakia	EUR 50,000	EUR 50,000		USD 56,243
Japan	USD 1,000,000	USD 1,000,000		USD 1,000,000
Korea	USD 2,000,000	USD 1,000,000		USD 2,000,000
Norway	NOK 41,000,000	NOK 41,000,000		<b>USD 4,712,102</b>
Sweden	USD 4,000,000	USD 4,000,000		<b>USD 4,000,000</b>
France	EUR 1,000,000	EUR 1,000,000		<b>USD 1,096,491</b>
Austria	EUR 1,000,000	EUR 1,000,000		<b>USD 1,058,201</b>
Denmark	DKK 7,000,000	DKK 7,000,000		<b>USD 1,017,737</b>
Italy	EUR 2,500,000	EUR 2,500,000		<b>USD 2,747,253</b>
Czech Republic	CZK 5,000,000	CZK 5,000,000		USD 201,597
<b>Total</b>			<b>Approx. 13.2M \$</b>	<b>USD 34,526,578</b>

Danish contribution of 7M DKK or equivalent of USD 1,017,737 was received during first week of 2016 as well as Czech contribution of 5M CZK. The USAID additional contribution of 7M USD was signed early January 2016.

# Financial Section (as of 31 Dec 2015)

Table 2: Expenditure Status (by donor)

Activity	Budget	Donor	Cumulative Expenditure Status as of 31 December 2015		Expenditures and Commitments	Balance Budget	Delivery Rate
			Commitments	Expenses + Full Asset Cost			
Window 1,2,3 and 4	8,300,000	USAID	3,576,958	1,764,252	5,341,210	2,958,790	64%
	1,124,859	Germany	676,268	199,520	875,788	249,071	78%
	5,291,006	Germany KFW	4,950,000		4,950,000	341,006	94%
	1,921,089	DFID	1,245,906	952,929	2,198,835	-277,746	114%
	56,243	Slovakia		35,155	35,155	21,088	63%
	1,000,000	Japan	533,158	250,069	783,227	216,773	78%
	2,000,000	Korea	638,138	482,777	1,120,915	879,085	56%
	1,058,201	Austria				1,058,201	0%
	1,096,491	France	230,830		230,830	865,661	21%
	4,000,000	Sweden	2,600,000		2,600,000	1,400,000	65%
	2,747,253	Italy	1,925,000		1,925,000	822,253	70%
	1,017,737	Denmark				1,017,737	
	4,712,102	Norway	861,981		861,981	3,850,121	18%
201,597	Czech Republic				201,597	0%	
<b>GMS</b>				294,776	294,776		
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,526,578</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>17,238,239</b>	<b>3,979,478</b>	<b>21,217,717</b>	<b>13,308,861</b>	<b>61%</b>

Danish contribution of 7M DKK or equivalent of USD 1,017,737 was received during first week of 2016 as well as Czech contribution of 5M CZK. The USAID additional contribution of 7M USD was signed early January 2016.

# Annexes

## Annex I: List of FFIS stabilization projects (status as of 10 January 2016)

### SALAH AL-DIN GOVERNORATE

No.	Title of the project	Estimated cost in US\$	Expected date of completion or delivery	Impact
1.	Rehabilitation of Tikrit central water station, treatment plant	1.3 million	4 February 2016	It is estimated that around 65,000 people in Tikrit district currently benefit from the increased and safe water supply thanks to the rehabilitation works. The rehabilitated Tikrit central water station was operational and completed in December 2015, apart from some additional pumps which will arrive in January 2016. The Tikrit water station is now back at its original pumping capacity of 2,250m <sup>3</sup> /hour, including purification.
2.	Procurement of heavy duty mounted excavator	175,000	20 January 2016	From August, an excavator was rented for 3 months. The new excavator will be used by the Salah al-Din Water Department to repair the water network
3.	Rehabilitation of Tikrit Qadisia water station stage-1 behind Salah al-Din main hospital with 2 units capacity 200 m <sup>3</sup> /hr for each unit	950,000	29 February 2016	Upon completion, it is estimated that around 16,000 people in North-Tikrit will benefit from the rehabilitation of the two water units in this project. Prior to the rehabilitation, the plant was working at very low capacity. After rehabilitation, the water station will reach its maximum pumping capacity of 400m <sup>3</sup> /hr including purification.
4.	Rehabilitation of Tikrit Qadisiya water station stage-2 behind Salah al-Din University with 3 units capacity 200 m <sup>3</sup> /hr for each unit	1.3 million	23 February 2016	Upon completion, it is estimated that around 24,000 people in North-Tikrit will benefit from the rehabilitation of the three water units in this project. After rehabilitation, the water station will reach its maximum capacity of 600m <sup>3</sup> /hr including purification. Prior to the rehabilitation, the water station was working with less than 50% of capacity and the treatment facility was not operational.
5.	Rehabilitation of Al Dour North water station with capacity of 450 m <sup>3</sup> /hour	950,000	30 April 2016	It is estimated that around 37,000 people in Al Dour and Mkeishifah will benefit from the rehabilitation of the water plant with improved and safe water supply
6.	Rehabilitation of Mkeishifah central water station with capacity of 250 m <sup>3</sup> /hour	875,000	31 March 2016	
<b>Subtotal water projects</b>		<b>6 million</b>		

No.	Title of the project	Estimated cost in US\$	Expected date of completion or delivery	Impact
7.	Renovation of Salah al-Din pharmacy department	260,000	5 November 2015	All health care centres in Salah al-Din district will benefit from the cold storage of vaccines and medicines in Pharmacy department
8.	Renovation of Primary health care center in Tikrit town (Ibn Siena)	190,000	24 December 2015	It is estimated that around 30,000 people in Tikrit district will benefit from the rehabilitated primary health care centres and ambulance services. These health care centres were not operational before rehabilitation.
9.	Renovation of 5 health care centres in Tikrit district	130,000	29 February 2016	
10.	Supply of 3 ambulances	270,000	31 January 2016	
11.	Rehabilitation of 2 health care centres in Al Dour city and 1 in Mkeishifah town	235,000	29 February 2016	It is estimated that around 20,000 people in Al Dour and 10,000 people in Mkeishifah will benefit from the rehabilitated health care centres
<b>Subtotal Health projects</b>		<b>1.085 million</b>		
12.	Restoring of electricity grid. Supplying of 50 transformers, 750 poles and 100km of electricity cables for Tikrit Electricity network (stage 1)	.8 million	9 November 2015	It is estimated that around 20,000 people in Tikrit will benefit from improved electricity supply and expanded coverage
13.	Supply of Mobile power station 33/11 KVA & Crane vehicle for maintenance electrical network (Stage 2)	1.4 million	30 May 2016	
14.	Installation of mobile power station for Tikrit University	.35million	15 March 2016	It is estimated that around 20,000 students in Tikrit University will benefit from the resumption of classes
<b>Subtotal Electricity projects</b>		<b>2.55 million</b>		

No.	Title of the project	Estimated cost in US\$	Expected date of completion or delivery	Impact
15.	Rehabilitation of 1 secondary and 2 primary schools in Tikrit district	150,000	9 December 2015	It is estimated that around 900 children will benefit from the rehabilitated schools in Tikrit and 250 children in Amerli.
16.	Rehabilitation of girls secondary school in Amerli sub-district	250,000	20 January 2016	
17.	Rehabilitation of 2 secondary schools and 2 primary schools in Al Dour and Mkeishifah, including al Shaimaa girls secondary school	350,000	31 March 2016	It is estimated that around 2,000 children will benefit from the rehabilitated schools
18.	Rehabilitation of female dorms in Tikrit University	500,000	15 March 2016	It is estimated that around 2,000 female students will benefit from the female dorms in Tikrit
<b>Subtotal Education projects</b>		<b>1.25 million</b>		
19.	Emergency employment creation through debris removal, solid waste collection and small house repairs in Tikrit (through 2 NGOs)	630,000	15 Dec 2015	400 workers will benefit from Cash for Work for a 3 months period, indirectly impacting 2,400 people
20.	Small business grants for micro/small enterprises in Tikrit	100,000	15 Dec 2015	Around 100 shopkeepers have benefited from small grants to re-open their businesses
21.	Emergency employment creation in Al Dour and Mkeishifah	500,000	31 March 2016	It is estimated that around 400 workers will benefit from Cash for Work for a 3 months period, indirectly impacting 2,400 people.
<b>Subtotal Emergency Employment projects</b>		<b>730,000</b>		
22.	Community reconciliation activities targeting Yathrib and IDP communities who have not yet returned	150,000	31 Jan 2016	Contract has been concluded with local NGO (Sanad)
<b>Subtotal Community Reconciliation projects</b>		<b>150,000</b>		
23.	Rehabilitation of Al Qadisiya police station in Tikrit	70,000	15 December 2015	Qadisiya neighborhood of around 20,000 people will benefit from increased police presence
<b>Total Estimated Projects Cost</b>		<b>11.83 million</b>		

## ANBAR GOVERNORATE

No.	Title of the project	Estimated cost in US\$	Expected date of completion or delivery	Impact
1.	Procurement of 3 mobile power station 33/11 KV for Ramadi City	3 million	30 May 2016	It is estimated that around 50,000 people will benefit from the electricity supply through mobile power stations
2.	Procurement of 103 generators 250 KV for Ramadi city	4 million	31 March 2016	It is estimated that around 200 households (around 1200 people) will benefit from 1 generator and therefore 123,600 people will benefit from the power supply by the total 103 generators. The first batch of 36 generators will be delivered by end of January 2016 and will benefit 43,200 people.
<b>Subtotal Electricity projects</b>		<b>7 million</b>		
3.	Procurement of 6 ambulances for Ramadi	300,000	29 February 2016	The ambulance services will benefit around 10,000 people
<b>Subtotal Health projects</b>		<b>.3 million</b>		
4.	Procurement of water pumps for Ramadi water station			
<b>Subtotal Water projects</b>				
<b>Total Estimated Project Cost</b>		<b>7.3 million</b>		

## NINEWAH GOVERNORATE

No.	Title of the project	Estimated cost in US\$	Expected date of completion or delivery	Impact
1.	Rehabilitation of Sinuni health care centre, including basic medical equipment	0.7 million	31 March 2016	It is estimated that around 30,000 people will benefit from the reestablishment of health services in Sinuni. The health centre was severely damaged and before rehabilitation the hospital was not admitting patients. It is managed by doctors and paramedical staff from CAPNI (Christian Aid Program Northern Iraq) who are treating the simple cases for which no hospital admission is required
<b>Subtotal Health projects</b>		<b>.7 million</b>		
2.	Livelihoods support to farmer communities in Rabiya through fertilizers for wheat crops	500,000	29 February 2016	The livelihoods support will reach around 1,700 families, indirectly benefiting 1 from increased income
3.	Cash for work for rubble removal and waste collection in Rabiya town	300,000	31 March 2016	The project is implemented by the French Red Cross and is currently ongoing.
<b>Subtotal Water projects</b>		<b>.8 million</b>		
4.	Inter and Intra-community dialogues to improve peaceful co-existence and reduce tensions (through UPP)	370,000	31 March 2016	Around 40 dialogue facilitators trained on conflict resolution for 20 community reconciliation projects
<b>Subtotal Community Reconciliation projects</b>		<b>.37 million</b>		
<b>Total Estimated Projects Cost</b>		<b>1.87 million</b>		

### DIYALA GOVERNORATE

No.	Title of the project	Estimated cost in US\$	Expected date of completion or delivery	Impact
1.	Inter and Intra-community dialogues to improve peaceful co-existence and reduce tensions (through Iraqi Centre for Negotiation Skills and Conflict Management)	300,000	31 March 2016	31 dialogue facilitators trained on conflict resolution (29% women), and led nine mediation workshops. 130 volunteers participated in the workshops.
<b>Subtotal Community Reconciliation projects</b>		<b>.3 million</b>		
<b>Total Estimated Projects Cost</b>		<b>1.87 million</b>		

## Annex II: Performance Tracking Matrix

FUNDING FACILITY FOR IMMEDIATE STABILIZATION QUARTERLY LOGFRAME REPORT (OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2015)		
<p>UNDAF Outcome 1: Government and communities' resilience to disasters (man-made and natural) strengthened Expected Country Program Outcome 3: Improved livelihoods opportunities for crisis-affected communities.</p> <p>Indicator: Number of returnees to targeted liberated areas of Salah al-Din, Ninewah, Diyala and Anbar Baseline (data as of April 2015): Salah al-Din: 27,000 returnees; Ninewah: 24,924 returnees; Diyala: 40,524 returnees; Anbar: 5,586 returnees Target: 700,000 total internally displaced persons have returned to their places of origin by the 31 December 2016 (end Q4)</p>		
INDICATORS, BASELINE, AND TARGETS	ACTIVITIES	Q4 PROGRESS
OUTPUT 1: Rapid local stabilization and recovery assessments are carried out with local authorities, UN agencies, and civil society actors		
<p>"Indicator: Assessment methodology to assist the provincial governments of liberated areas to systematically determine needs is developed. Baseline: There is no methodology employed by the provincial governments of liberated areas for needs assessments. Target: UNDP creates a needs assessment methodology that is employed by the provincial governments of liberated areas.</p> <p>Indicator: Percentage of liberated areas with assessments undertaken. Baseline: No assessments undertaken in liberated areas. Target: By 31 March 2016 (end Q1), 80 percent of liberated areas have had assessments undertaken."</p>	<p>UNDP and Government of Iraq develop assessment methodology, requiring consultation with local authorities, UN agencies, World Bank, and other stakeholders.</p> <p>Conduct rapid stabilization and recovery assessment and final reports</p> <p>Carry out local assessments with verification missions and site visits</p> <p>Conduct prioritization workshops</p> <p>Translate assessments and findings</p> <p>Finalize and publish reports</p> <p>Advise local and provincial authorities on assessment process and prioritization</p> <p>Deploy senior coordination advisor for coordinating the assessment exercises</p>	<p>Methodology developed and being replicated in 3 areas of engagement.</p> <p>One stabilization needs assessment report was finalized in Q4. The assessment was developed through a prioritization workshop, field verification missions and additional civil society consultations. The work has been coordinated by a senior advisor during the entire process. Four total needs assessments were produced, including costing, in English and Arabic. UNDP further produced two site visit reports following missions to Ninewah and Diyala. The reports detail updates to the stabilization needs assessment conducted in Q2 and 3 for Ninewah, and an initial survey of stabilization needs in Diyala. UNDP conducted a pre-liberation stabilization needs assessment for Ramadi, but no reports were produced due to data inaccuracy. UNDP produced a total of six reports since FFIS inception.</p>
Overall output progress: 46% of liberated areas in Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewah provinces have been assessed.		

**OUTPUT 2: The Government of Iraq is supported to address the immediate stabilization and recovery needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the sustainable return of internally displaced persons.**

2.1 Rehabilitation of light infrastructure in newly liberated areas (Window 1)

<p>Indicator: Number of infrastructure projects rehabilitated in provinces with liberated implemented.</p> <p>Baseline: Liberated areas in 4 target provinces have substantially reduced access to basic services (water, health, electricity, education, and municipal services).</p> <p>Target: Infrastructure for basic services (water, health, electricity, education, and municipal services) have been restored in selected areas of liberated provinces, with a target of 50 total projects in each province with liberated areas completed by 31 Dec 2016 (end Q4).</p>	<p>2.1.1 Identified priority projects are being implemented</p> <p>Rehabilitation of water and water treatment infrastructure in Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewah Governorates</p> <p>Rehabilitation of primary health care centres in Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewah as well as Tikrit pharmacy department</p> <p>Rehabilitate electricity networks in Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewah Governorates</p>	<p>6 water projects were being implemented in Salah al-Din; all are expected completion in Q1.</p> <p>0 water projects were implemented in Anbar, Ninewah, or Diyala.</p> <p>9 health projects were being implemented in Salah al-Din; 2 projects were completed in Q4.</p> <p>1 health project was completed in Ninewah.</p> <p>0 health projects were initiated/completed in Diyala or Anbar.</p> <p>3 projects were being implemented; 1 project was completed in Salah al-Din.</p> <p>4 projects were initiated in Anbar.</p> <p>0 projects initiated in Ninewah and Diyala.</p>
<p>Indicator: Stabilization Operations Service Center established to manage infrastructure rehabilitation procurement and implementation.</p> <p>Baseline: No stabilization-specific operations service center.</p> <p>Target: Stabilization Operations Service Center is operational and fully staffed by 31 December 2015 (end of Q4).</p>	<p>Rehabilitate primary and secondary schools in Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala and Ninewah Governorates</p> <p>Rehabilitate police stations in Salah al-Din and Anbar Governorates</p> <p>Procure equipment for municipal services and ambulances</p>	<p>9 projects were being implemented in Salah al-Din; 3 projects were completed.</p> <p>0 projects were initiated in Ninewah, Diyala, or Anbar.</p> <p>1 project was initiated and completed in Salah al-Din.</p> <p>0 projects were implemented in Ninewah, Diyala, or Anbar</p> <p>1 delivery of 3x ambulances were being delivered in Salah al-Din. Delivery delayed to Q1.</p> <p>1 delivery of 6x ambulances was initiated in Anbar.</p>
	<p>2.1.2 Operations Service Center established to support rapid implementation of infrastructure rehabilitation</p> <p>Recruit operations staff, mainly finance, procurement and human resources</p> <p>Hire monitoring agent/engineer to monitor work and government technical departments</p>	<p>100% of staff has been recruited, including senior operations manager. An additional procurement specialist will be recruited in Q1 as well as 2 civil engineers.</p> <p>An electrical engineer and medical officer were hired to monitor work and coordinate technical departments for electricity and health sectors across the four governorates. Two civil engineers hired in Q3 monitored of rehabilitation projects in Salah al-Din and Ninewah. One liaison officer monitored implementation of FFIS activities in Salah al-Din. Additional engineers and monitors will be hired in Q1.</p>
<p>Overall output progress: 5 of 29 projects were completed in Salah al-Din; 1 project was completed in Ninewah; and 0 of 6 projects were completed in Anbar; and no projects have been identified or initiated in Diyala. The Stabilization Operations Center is operational.</p>		

2.2 Support livelihoods by jumpstarting local economy and generating income (Window 2)		
<p>Indicator: Number of job opportunities for individuals, including women and youth, created in liberated areas of target provinces. Baseline: No job creation projects being implemented or initiatives taking place. Target: A total of 5,000 job opportunities created by 31 December 2016 (end Q4) in each target province. 750 (15%) will be for women and 3,750 (75%) for youth (under 30).</p> <p>Indicator: Number of small business grants, including women-owned businesses, awarded in liberated areas of target provinces. Baseline: Small businesses have no grants. Target: A total of 500 small businesses receive grants in 4 target provinces by 31 December 2016 (end Q4). A total of 50 women's small businesses will receive grants.</p> <p>Indicator: Technical experts provide training and monitor NGOs on cash for work and cash grants administration Baseline: No technical experts are available to mentor or monitor NGOs on cash for work and cash grants administration. Target: One technical expert is deployed in each of target provinces with liberated areas to mentor and monitor NGOs' implementation of cash for work and cash grants.</p>	<p>2.2.1 Quick employment creation projects launched in liberated areas Select NGOs and ensure standards for payment/security and deliverables are set Cash for work activities initiated in Salah al-Din, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar provinces Recruit NGOs for cash for work who can incorporate female participants and identify "female-friendly" work sites Recruit and train youth-oriented NGOs for cash for work schema</p>	<p>2 NGOs (Al Noor Universal Foundation and Human Relief Foundation) contracted for cash for work in Salah al-Din. HRF created 9,600 work opportunities since signing contract on 1 September, employing 200 individuals for 48 days. 16% were of participants were women and 70% were youth. Al Noor created 10,000 work opportunities since starting work 24 August, employing 200 individuals for 50 days. 11% of participants were women, 70% were youth. A primary partner of both NGOs for recruiting workers was the Tikrit Youth Council.</p>
	<p>2.2.2 Small business grants launched in liberated areas Select NGOs and ensure standards for payment/security and deliverables are set Cash grants provided to small businesses in Salah al-Din, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar provinces Training and subsequent cash grants provided to women's small businesses in Salah al-Din, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar provinces</p>	<p>1 NGO (French Relief Council) and 1 UN agency (Food and Agriculture Organization) were selected in Q4 to conduct livelihoods activities in Ninewah.</p>
	<p>2.2.3 Technical team of livelihoods experts are available to train NGOs on cash for work and cash grant modalities and to provide mentoring or coaching during the process</p> <p>Deployment of Cash for Work and livelihoods expert</p> <p>Deploy staff for monitoring of livelihoods activities</p>	<p>0 NGOs were selected for Anbar or Diyala. 1 NGO (HRF) distributed cash grants to 100 businesses in Salah al-Din, for approximately \$1,000 per shop, none of the businesses are headed by women. 0 NGOs were selected to provide cash grants in Ninewah, Diyala, or Anbar.</p> <p>Livelihoods expert provided mentoring and advice to NGO partners on payment modalities, selection criteria, selection of sites, reporting and monitoring. "The embedded liaison officer was monitoring livelihoods activities in Salah al-Din since the inception of the projects. Livelihoods expert conducted two site visits to monitor NGO activities.</p>
<p>Overall output progress: FFIS exceeded the target for work opportunities created through cash for work in Salah al-Din; targets will likely need to be adjusted for the next reporting period. Targets for women participation in cash for work and small grants were under expectation for the first phase of the project, but can be adjusted to meet the target by the end of Q4 2016. Livelihoods partners have been selected in Ninewah, but not in Anbar or Diyala. Livelihoods experts and monitors are in place.</p>		

**2.3 Technical support is provided to Government authorities to build local capacity to facilitate stabilization (Window 3)**

Indicator: Authorities in target provinces with liberated areas demonstrate capacity to plan for stabilization activities and produce and implement stabilization plans.  
 Baseline: Limited capacity to develop and implement comprehensive stabilization plans.  
 Target: By 31 March 2016 (end Q1), authorities in each of the target provinces with liberated areas produce and implement comprehensive stabilization plans.

2.3.1 Embed technical experts with Ninewah, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Anbar provinces and with municipal offices to assist with stabilization planning, coordination, implementation, and monitoring.

Hire and deploy technical expertise to Ninewah and Salah al-Din for six months, embedded with Planning Departments

Deploy Area Coordinator and technical experts to Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewah to support coordination of assistance, monitoring of activities and ensure complementarity with government funded initiatives

Conduct specific training (workshops, meetings, etc.) on planning, budgeting, and monitoring as part of LADP methodology in Salah al-Din, Ninewah, Anbar, and Diyala

Hire specific technical expertise for ad hoc needs identified by Salah al-Din and/or Ninewah provinces or ad-hoc specialized expertise to the Government of Iraq, if required for stabilization purposes

Provide stabilization advisory services to Ninewah, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Anbar in support of their stabilization plans and activities.

The Area Coordinator for Salah al-Din and Anbar coordinated FFIS and Governorate Stabilization Activities. An additional Area Coordinator was in the recruitment process for Diyala and Ninewah. The embedded Liaison Officer has been deployed to Salah al-Din since Q3 to monitor implementation of stabilization activities. An additional Liaison Officer was hired for Anbar. Stabilization Advisor was embedded in Anbar Governor's Office, and provided advice to Government stabilization plans and activities. Experts for the Governorate Planning Departments have not been prioritized by any Governors, thus were not hired yet. Training workshops for planning, budgeting, and monitoring did not occur during Q4. UNDP began hiring ad hoc expertise identified by Anbar Governor, which includes a Special Assistant and Communications Specialist. The Ninewah, Salah al-Din, and Diyala Governors will identify further positions in Q1. UNDP stabilization advisors team was set up quickly and has helped with drawing up of the Anbar stabilization plan.

Overall output progress: Anbar stabilization strategy has been finalized, and UNDP is advising detailed stabilization plans for Ramadi. UNDP built rapport with new Governor of Ninewah to plan for and implement stabilization plans in liberated areas, such as Sinjar. UNDP will further engage Salah al-Din Governorate for capacity needs. Engagement in Diyala was endorsed in November, an assessment of Governorate needs will be conducted in Q1.

2.4 Design and implement community reconciliation and dialogue initiatives (Window 4)		
<p>Indicator: Conflict analysis methodology developed. Baseline: No conflict analysis methodology used. Target: Conflict analysis methodology developed by 30 Sept 2015 (end Q3).</p> <p>Indicator: Conflict analyses are conducted in liberated areas. Baseline: No conflict analysis conducted in the liberated areas. Target: Conflict analysis conducted in 80 percent of liberated districts by 31 March 2016 (end Q1, see narrative report for liberated areas mapped).</p> <p>Indicator: Local facilitators (NGOs, media, community leaders, women, and local government authorities) are trained on conflict resolution, community dialogue, and best practices on community restorative processes. Baseline: No facilitators have been trained. Target: By 31 March 2016 (end Q1) at least 50 dialogue facilitators (NGOs, media, community leaders and local government authorities) will have been trained in each of target provinces with liberated areas. 20 of 50 facilitators will be women in each of the targeted provinces with liberated areas.</p> <p>Indicator: Structured dialogues within and between communities at risk of violence are conducted. Baseline: No structured dialogues have occurred. Target: By 31 March 2016 (end Q1), 20 intra- and intercommunity dialogues have been conducted in each of 4 target provinces.</p> <p>Indicator: Develop monitoring tool to monitor changes in communal tensions. Baseline: No monitoring tools to monitor changes in communal tensions are being employed. Target: Develop and employ monitoring tool to measure changes in communal tensions by 31 December 2015 (end Q4).</p>	<p>2.4.1 Develop a methodology for a detailed conflict analysis covering areas that will be potentially engaged for community reconciliation programming through FFIS. Conflict analysis informs community reconciliation project design Hire and deploy Community Reconciliation Expert Conduct local conflict analysis in specific liberated areas in Ninewah, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Anbar Conduct site visits and interviews with civilian population, including IDPs, local authorities, civil society, and other stakeholders to deepen analysis and identify specific concerns</p> <p>2.4.2 Provincial Governments, local authorities, media, and community leaders are engaged and trained on mediation/community reconciliation processes, and media develop conflict sensitive messaging Train dialogue facilitators in liberated from NGOs, local media, and local authorities on conflict resolution, community dialogue, and best practices on community restorative processes Conduct intra- and intercommunity dialogues, and establish informal conflict resolution mechanisms that target community leaders, women, youth, and members of local community, judiciary, and local security representatives to agree on set of measures to address local grievances Identify partners and implement small projects to engage different communities in shared projects such as social work in community, educational programs, inter-community rehabilitation projects with the aim to slowly rebuild social fabric Train local media to develop a platform for community reconciliation, notably in developing conflict sensitive messaging and in providing space for media to play a more prominent role in holding local institutions accountable to non-discriminatory practices Engage provincial council, local authorities and community leaders in developing conflict sensitive messaging</p> <p>2.4.3 Systematically monitor and document community tensions and retribution Develop tools and criteria to monitor and measure changes in communal tensions Recruit a monitoring officer to measure communal tensions and to engage NGOs, community leaders, Government officials Conduct workshop with NGO/community organizations on lessons learned</p> <p>Overall output progress: Conflict analysis has been carried out in around 67% of liberated areas. Community Reconciliation Expert was deployed to oversee implementation of trainings, dialogue, and mediation projects in Ninewah and Salah al-Din. 48 facilitators were trained in Ninewah, 25 of which were women.</p>	<p>Community Reconciliation expert was deployed and conducted conflict analysis in Ninewah sub-districts, Tikrit, Yathrib, Al Dour, Mkeishifah, Muqdadiyah, and Al Saadiyah. Analysis was informed by interviews with communities, local authorities, and IDPs in Erbil, Kirkuk and Baghdad.</p> <p>UNDP selected four NGOs (Sanad, Un Ponte Per, IQCM and PATRIR) to carry out training of CSOs and conduct dialogues in Ninewah and Salah al-Din. Initial phases of activities consisted of structured interviews to inform nature of issues and tensions in Salah al-Din and Ninewah.</p> <p>Un Ponte Per/PATRIR trained dialogue facilitators in Ninewah, developing their monitoring, mediation, and dialogue capacity. Media outreach was included in the Ninewah activities, but initial plans to implement media activities through Institute for War and Peace Reporting were delayed due to unexpected IWPR staffing issues. The SANAD for Peace building organization gathered stakeholders to develop dialogue trainings and mechanisms to mediate tensions in communities with IDPs. The findings of the trainings and workshops, as well as the second phase of implementation, will occur in Q1.</p> <p>A monitoring expert on social tensions has started in September to establish a baseline and to measure tensions in targeted areas, with qualitative and quantitative data.</p>

<p>“Indicator: Project Management structure is in place.          Baseline: No Project Management team in place.          Target: Project Management team in place by 31 December 2015 (end Q4)”</p>	2.5 Project Management Team Employed	
	<p>Set up Project Team with Project Manager          Ensure appropriate security management arrangements are in place, including equipment          Deploy strategic communications expert          Monitoring and evaluation system is put in place and employed</p>	<p>The Project Team is in place, but will continue to expand in Q1. Security management arrangements are in place, and the Strategic Communications Expert worked throughout the reporting period. Third party monitoring and evaluation entities will be hired in Q1.</p>

## Annex III: Risk Framework

### POLITICAL RISKS TIKRIT

Description	Mitigation measures
Elite capture. Proposed/selected projects do not correspond with priorities of returnees/ local population	<i>Consultations with IDPs and returnees in Tikrit on priorities as additional inputs to decision making. Funding decisions for projects are endorsed by FFIS Steering Committee.</i>
Stabilization efforts and critical decision making are marred by weak political leadership, which does not have the authority or respect of the security forces, community leaders or the general population.	<i>Good offices at high political level to provide advice or recommendations. Technical level advisory support to support decision making and possibly, provide expertise or other capacity support</i>
Lack of Government financial resources for liberated areas and Government unable to implement priority capital investment projects in liberated areas	<i>Raise essential requirements to the attention of the Prime Minister's office and liaise with the Ministry of Finance. Liaising with WB on implementation of stabilization/recovery loan.</i>
Sectarian or tribal engineering backed by forces either inside or outside the liberated areas, which increases grievances among tribes and population.	<i>International community to raise concerns at highest level and leverage the FFIS interventions at political level. Shared understanding of the situation on the ground and local conflict analysis will be helpful tools..</i>
Significant distrust between PMF and local population prevents IDPs from returning despite stabilization efforts	<i>Engage PMF and local authorities on principles of protection of returnees and raise security concerns at high level</i>
Lack of pragmatism, timely planning and commitment to move forward	<i>Provide technical support to Governorates to prepare for stabilization effort. Task Force with PMO convened regularly as a platform to raise concerns. Building trust with the governors and their advisors/deputies to provide support to planning and coordination.</i>
Inability to communicate the role of international community in stabilization and international community is used as scapegoat when things go wrong.	<i>Strategic communications officer in FFIS and joint advocacy/messaging by UN and international community. Weekly briefings to PMO including obstacles encountered.</i>
Continued human rights violations and the failure to solve property issues and other grievances lead to impunity and growing frustrations of the returning population	<i>Document protection concerns and share them with international community. Advocate with high level decision makers to raise awareness and tackle the sensitive issues. Information from protection monitors in the field could feed into stabilization work.</i>

## SECURITY RISKS TIKRIT

Description	Mitigation measures
<p>Poor command and control of security forces, incapacitated police forces and division of roles of PMF/police not clear. Risk of looting of (FFIS) assets during stabilization phase.</p>	<p><i>Maintain a clear understanding of relationship between UN, Governorate and security forces on the ground during the implementation of FFIS. Deployment of liaison officer on the ground to participate in Control Centre and raise security concerns for FFIS interventions with relevant counterparts. International community to advise and monitor coordination between security actors and governorate, and report back to coalition.</i></p>
<p>Possibility of recapture of Tikrit by ISIL leading to displacement and further destruction of infrastructure. IS counter offensive is heightening insecurity.</p>	<p><i>Where possible, work with control centres to develop extraction plan for critical FFIS assets. Monitor security situation</i></p>
<p>Mass infestation of IEDs and slow removal of these will cause casualties and slow down returns and recovery work.</p>	<p><i>Conduct iterative and detailed analysis of returnees experiences and patters, and document IED/UXO risks. ISF and federal police are clearing IEDs/UXOs. Coordination of international support by UNMAS for IED/UXO clearance.</i></p>
<p>Weak capacity of the local police to take over security functions. Militias prolong their stay as long as local police is not able to take over their tasks.</p>	<p><i>Training of local police by international community. Maintain clear understanding of capacity and numbers of police and other security actors in stabilization areas. Build relationships with local leaders and Gol officials and leverage community buy-in to protect and support FFIS assets.</i></p>
<p>Community violence increases and mistrust among communities worsens</p>	<p><i>Conduct detailed local analysis identifying sources of tension and overlay activities support distribution with demographic data available. Document risks to FFIS assets and leverage international community and senior Gol to thwart community violence.</i></p>

## OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS TIKRIT

Description	Mitigation measures
Administrative gaming by local authorities	<i>UNDP's rules and procedures are clearly communicated to the counterparts and funding decisions have the backing of the steering committee.</i>
Poor service of private sector work and huge cost	<i>Strong monitoring mechanism on the ground during implementation phase</i>
Not enough local partners for sensitive reconciliation work	<i>Phased approach to reconciliation and direct engagement by UNDP to reach out to tribal/religious leaders if no suitable local partner is available. Conduct iterative, detailed local analysis and form a trained group of facilitators for mediation and dialogue</i>
Very limited Government budget for liberated areas and lack of financial resources to ensure operation and maintenance cost of infrastructure	<i>Joint messaging by international community to high political leadership. Liaise with World Bank on implementation of loan for recovery activities. Manage expectations of local population and Government so that messaging on stabilization reflects realistic deliverables. As appropriate, advise Governorate and line Ministries on linking stabilization plans with medium and long-term service delivery.</i>
Lack of qualified personnel returning to Tikrit to ensure delivery of services (technicians, teachers, doctors etc.)	<i>Agree with counterparts on availability of trained personnel before infrastructure starts</i>

## United Nations Development Programme in Iraq

